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Abstract
This paper formulates and studies a general continuous-time behavioral portfolio
selection model under Kahneman and Tversky’s (cumulative) prospect theory, featuring
S-shaped utility (value) functions and probability distortions. Unlike the conventional
expected utility maximization model, such a behavioral model could be easily mis-
formulated (a.k.a. ill-posed) if its different components do not coordinate well with each
other. Certain classes of an ill-posed model are identified. A systematic approach, which
is fundamentally different from the ones employed for the utility model, is developed to
solve a well-posed model, assuming a complete market and general Itoˆ processes for asset
prices. The optimal terminal wealth positions, derived in fairly explicit forms, possess
surprisingly simple structure reminiscent of a gambling policy betting on a good state
of the world while accepting a fixed, known loss in case of a bad one. An example with
a two-piece CRRA utility is presented to illustrate the general results obtained, and is
solved completely for all admissible parameters. The effect of the behavioral criterion
on the risky allocations is finally discussed.
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ioral criterion, ill-posedness, S-shaped function, probability distortion, Choquet integral
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1 Introduction
Mean–variance and expected utility maximization are by far the two predominant investment
decision rules in financial portfolio selection. Portfolio theory in the dynamic setting (both
discrete time and continuous time) has been established in the past twenty years, again
centering around these two frameworks while employing heavily among others the martingale
theory, convex duality and stochastic control; see Duffie (1996), Karatzas and Shreve (1998),
and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) for systematic accounts on dynamic utility maximization, and
Li and Ng (2000), Zhou and Li (2000), and Jin, Yan and Zhou (2004) for recent studies on
the mean–variance (including extensions to mean–risk) counterpart.
Expected utility theory (EUT), developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) based
on an axiomatic system, has an underlying assumption that decision makers are rational and
risk averse when facing uncertainties. In the context of asset allocations, its basic tenets are:
Investors evaluate wealth according to final asset positions; they are uniformly risk averse;
and they are able to objectively evaluate probabilities. These, however, have long been criti-
cized to be inconsistent with the way people do decision making in the real world. Substantial
experimental evidences have suggested a systematic violation of the EUT principles. Specif-
ically, the following anomalies (as opposed to the assumed rationality in EUT) in human
behaviors are evident from daily life:
• People evaluate assets on gains and losses (which are defined with respect to a reference
point), not on final wealth positions;
• People are not uniformly risk averse: they are risk-averse on gains and risk-taking on
losses, and significantly more sensitive to losses than to gains;
• People overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities.
In addition, there are widely known paradoxes and puzzles that EUT fails to explain,
including the Allais paradox [Allais (1953)], Ellesberg paradox [Ellesberg (1961)], Friedman
and Savage puzzle [Friedman and Savage (1948)], and the equity premium puzzle [Mehra and
Prescott (1985)].
Considerable attempts and efforts have been made to address the drawback of EUT,
among them notably the so-called non-additive utility theory [see, for example, Fishburn
(1998)]. Unfortunately, most of these theories are far too complicated to be analyzable and
applicable, and some of them even lead to new paradoxes. In 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) proposed the prospect theory (PT) for decision making under uncertainty, incorporating
human emotions and psychology into their theory. Later, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) fine
tuned the PT to the cumulated prospect theory (CPT) in order to be consistent with the first-
order stochastic dominance. Among many other ingredients, the key elements of Kahneman
and Tversky’s Nobel-prize-winning theory are
• A reference point (or neutral outcome/benchmark/breakeven point/status quo) in wealth
that defines gains and losses;
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• A value function (which replaces the notion of utility function), concave for gains and
convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains (a behavior called loss aversion);
• A probability distortion that is a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale, which
enlarges a small probability and diminishes a large probability.
There have been burgeoning research interests in incorporating the PT into portfolio
choice; nonetheless they have been hitherto overwhelmingly limited to the single-period set-
ting; see for example Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Shefrin and Statman (2000), Levy and Levy
(2004), Bassett et al. (2004), Gomes (2005), and De Giorgi and Post (2005), with emphases
on qualitative properties and empirical experiments. Analytical research on dynamic, espe-
cially continuous-time, asset allocation featuring behavioral criteria is literally nil according
to our best knowledge. [In this connection the only paper we know of that has some bearing
on the PT for the continuous time setting is Berkelaar, Kouwenberg and Post (2004) where
a very specific two-piece power utility function is considered; however, the probability distor-
tion, which is one of the major ingredients of the PT and which causes the main difficulty, is
absent in that paper.] Such a lack of study on continuous-time behavioral portfolio selection
is certainly not because the problem is uninteresting or unimportant; rather it is because, we
believe, that the problem is massively difficult as compared with the conventional expected
utility maximization model. Many conventional and convenient approaches, such as convex
optimization, dynamic programming, and stochastic control, fall completely apart in handling
such a behavioral model: First, the utility function (or value function as called in the PT)
is partly concave and partly convex (also referred to as an S-shaped function), whereas the
global convexity/concavity is a necessity in traditional optimization. Second, the nonlinear
distortion in probabilities abolishes virtually all the nice properties associated with the nor-
mal additive probability and linear expectation. In particular, the dynamic consistency of the
conditional expectation with respect to a filtration, which is the foundation of the dynamic
programming principle, is absent due to the distorted probability. Worse still, the coupling
of these two ill-behaved features greatly amplifies the difficulty of the problem1. Even the
well-posedness of the problem2 is no longer something that can be taken for granted.
This paper first establishes a general continuous-time portfolio selection model under the
CPT, involving behavioral criteria defined on possibly continuous random variables. The
probability distortions lead to the involvement of the Choquet integrals [Choquet (1953/54)],
instead of the conventional expectation. We then carry out, analytically, extensive investiga-
tions on the model while developing new approaches in deriving the optimal solutions. First
of all, by assuming that the market is complete, the asset prices follow general Itoˆ processes,
and the individual behavior of the investor in question will not affect the market, we need
only to consider an optimization problem in terms of the terminal wealth. This is the usual
1In Berkelaar, Kouwenberg and Post (2004) an essentially convexification technique is employed to deal
with the non-convexity of the problem. However, it does not work any longer in the presence of a distorted
probability.
2A maximization problem is called well-posed if its supremum is finite; otherwise it is ill-posed. An ill-posed
problem is a mis-formulated one: the trade-off is not set right so that one can always push the objective value
to be arbitrarily high.
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trick employed in the conventional utility maximization, which also enables us to get around
the inapplicability of the dynamic programming in the current setting. Having said this,
our main endeavor is to find the optimal terminal wealth, which is a fundamentally different
and difficult problem due to the behavioral criterion. As mentioned earlier such a behavioral
model could be easily ill-posed and, therefore, we first identify several general cases where
the model is indeed ill-posed. Then we move on to finding optimal solutions for a well-posed
model. In doing so we decompose the original problem into two sub-problems: one takes care
of the gain part and the other the loss part, both parameterized by an initial budget that is
the price of the gain part (i.e., the positive change) of the terminal payoff over the reference
wealth position and an event when the terminal payoff represents a gain. At the outset the
gain part problem is a constrained non-concave maximization problem due to the probability
distortion; yet by changing the decision variable and taking a series of transformations, we
turn it into a concave maximization problem where the Lagrange method is applicable. The
loss part problem, nevertheless, is more subtle because it is to minimize a concave functional
even after the similar transformations. We are able to characterize explicitly its solutions to
be certain “corner points” via delicate analysis. There is yet one more twist in deriving the
optimal solution to the original model given the solutions to the above two problems: one
needs to find the “best” parameters – the initial budget and the event of a terminal gain –
by solving another constrained optimization problem.
As mathematically complicated and sophisticated the solution procedure turns out to
be, the final solutions are surprisingly and beautifully simple: the optimal terminal wealth
resembles the payoff of a portfolio of two binary (or digital) options written on a mutual fund
(induced by the state pricing density), characterized by a single number. This number, in
turn, can be identified by solving a very simple two-dimensional mathematical programming
problem. The optimal strategy is therefore a gambling policy, betting on good states of
the market, by buying a contingent claim and selling another. We present an example with
the same value function taken by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and demonstrate that our
general results lead to a complete solution of the model for all admissible parameters involved.
Furthermore, for the case when the market parameters are constants, we are able to derive the
optimal portfolio in closed form, thereby understand how the behavioral criteria may change
the risky asset allocations.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) we establish, for the first time,
a bona fide continuous-time behavioral portfolio selection model a` la cumulative prospect
theory, featuring very general S-shaped utility functions and probability distortions; 2) we
demonstrate that the well-posedness becomes an eminent issue for the behavioral model, and
identify several ill-posed problems; 3) we develop an approach, fundamentally different from
the existing ones for the expected utility model, to overcome the immense difficulties arising
from the analytically ill-behaved utility functions and probability distortions. Some of the
sub-problems solvable by this approach, such as constrained maximization and minimization
of Choquet integrals, are interesting, in both theory and applications, in their own rights;
and 4) we obtain fairly explicit solutions to a general model, and closed-form solutions for an
important special case, based on which we are able to examine how the allocations to equity
are influenced by behavioral criteria.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 the behavioral model is formu-
lated, and its possible ill-posedness is addressed in Section 3. The main results of the paper
are stated in Section 4. The procedure of analytically solving the general model is developed
in Sections 5 – 7, leading to a proof of the main results in Section 8. A special case with a
two-piece CRRA utility function is presented in Section 9 to demonstrate the general results
obtained. Section 10 addresses the issue of how the behavioral criterion would affect the risky
allocations. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 11. Finally, technical preliminaries
are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
In this paper T is a fixed terminal time and (Ω,F , P, {Ft}t≥0) is a fixed filtered complete
probability space on which is defined a standard Ft-adapted m-dimensional Brownian motion
W (t) ≡ (W 1(t), · · · ,Wm(t))′ with W (0) = 0. It is assumed that Ft = σ{W (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
augmented by all the null sets. Here and throughout the paper A′ denotes the transpose of a
matrix A.
We define a continuous-time financial market following Karatzas and Shreve (1998). In
the market there are m + 1 assets being traded continuously. One of the assets is a bank
account whose price process S0(t) is subject to the following equation:
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, t ∈ [0, T ]; S0(0) = s0 > 0, (1)
where the interest rate r(·) is an Ft-progressively measurable, scalar-valued stochastic process
with
∫ T
0
|r(s)|ds < +∞, a.s.. The other m assets are stocks whose price processes Si(t),
i = 1, · · · , m, satisfy the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dSi(t) = Si(t)[bi(t)dt+
m∑
j=1
σij(t)dW
j(t)], t ∈ [0, T ]; Si(0) = si > 0, (2)
where bi(·) and σij(·), the appreciation and dispersion (or volatility) rates, respectively,
are scalar-valued, Ft-progressively measurable stochastic processes with
∫ T
0
[
∑m
i=1 |bi(t)| +∑m
i,j=1 |σij(t)|2]dt < +∞, a.s..
Set the excess rate of return vector process
B(t) := (b1(t)− r(t), · · · , bm(t)− r(t))′,
and define the volatility matrix process σ(t) := (σij(t))m×m. Basic assumptions imposed on
the market parameters throughout this paper are summarized as follows:
Assumption 2.1
(i) There exists c ∈ IR such that ∫ T
0
r(s)ds ≥ c, a.s..
(ii) Rank (σ(t)) = m, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s..
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(ii) There exists an IRm-valued, uniformly bounded, Ft-progressively measurable process
θ(·) such that σ(t)θ(t) = B(t), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s..
It is well known that under these assumptions there exists a unique risk-neutral (martin-
gale) probability measure Q defined by dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= ρ(t), where
ρ(t) := exp
{
−
∫ t
0
[
r(s) +
1
2
|θ(s)|2
]
ds−
∫ t
0
θ(s)′dW (s)
}
(3)
is the pricing kernel or state density price. Denote ρ := ρ(T ). It is clear that 0 < ρ < +∞
a.s., and 0 < Eρ < +∞.
A random variable ξ is said to have no atom if P{ξ = a} = 0 ∀a ∈ IR. The following
assumption is in force throughout this paper.
Assumption 2.2 ρ admits no atom.
The preceding assumption is not essential, and is imposed to avoid undue technicality. In
particular, it is satisfied when r(·) and θ(·) are deterministic with ∫ T
0
|θ(t)|2dt 6= 0 (in which
case ρ is a nondegenerate lognormal random variable). We are also going to use the following
notation:
ρ¯ ≡ esssup ρ := sup {a ∈ IR : P{ρ > a} > 0} ,
ρ ≡ essinf ρ := inf {a ∈ IR : P{ρ < a} > 0} .
(4)
Consider an agent, with an initial endowment x0 ∈ IR (fixed throughout this paper)3,
whose total wealth at time t ≥ 0 is denoted by x(t). Assume that the trading of shares takes
place continuously in a self-financing fashion (i.e., there is no consumption or income) and
there are no transaction costs. Then x(·) satisfies [see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1998)]
dx(t) = [r(t)x(t) +B′(t)π(t)]dt+ π(t)′σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]; x(0) = x0, (5)
where π(·) ≡ (π1(·), · · · , πm(·))′ is the portfolio of the agent with πi(t), i = 1, 2 · · · , m,
denoting the total market value of the agent’s wealth in the i-th asset at time t. A portfolio
π(·) is said to be admissible if it is an IRm-valued, Ft-progressively measurable process with∫ T
0
|σ(t)′π(t)|2dt < +∞ and
∫ T
0
|B(t)′π(t)|dt < +∞, a.s..
An admissible portfolio π(·) is said to be tame if the corresponding discounted wealth process,
S0(t)
−1x(t), is almost surely bounded from below (the bound may depend on π(·)).
The following result follows from Karatzas and Shreve (1998, p. 24, Theorem 6.6) noting
Karatzas and Shreve (1998, p. 21, Definition 6.1) or Cox and Huang (1989).
Proposition 2.1 For any FT -measurable random variable ξ such that ξ is almost surely
bounded from below and E[ρξ] = x0, there exists a tame admissible portfolio π(·) such that
the corresponding wealth process x(·) satisfies x(T ) = ξ.
3Precisely speaking, x0 should be the difference between the agent’s initial wealth and a (discounted)
reference wealth; for details see Remarks 2.1 and 2.2 below.
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In the conventional portfolio theory, an investor’s preference is modelled by the expected
utility of the terminal wealth. In this paper, we study a portfolio model featuring human
behaviors by working within the CPT framework of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). First
of all, in CPT there is a natural outcome or benchmark, assumed to be 0 (evaluated at
the terminal time, T ) in this paper without loss of generality (see Remark 2.1 below for
elaborations on this point), which serves as a base point to distinguish gains from losses.
Next, we are given two utility functions u+(·) and u−(·), both mapping from IR+ to IR+,
that measure the gains and losses respectively. There are two additional functions T+(·) and
T−(·) from [0, 1] to [0, 1], representing the distortions in probability for the gains and losses
respectively. The technical assumptions on these functions, which will be imposed throughout
this paper, are summarized as follows.
Assumption 2.3 u+(·) and u−(·): IR+ 7→ IR+, are strictly increasing, concave, with u+(0) =
u−(0) = 0. Moreover, u+(·) is strictly concave and twice differentiable, with the Inada
conditions u′+(0+) = +∞ and u′+(+∞) = 0.
Assumption 2.4 T+(·) and T−(·): [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], are differentiable and strictly increasing,
with T+(0) = T−(0) = 0 and T+(1) = T−(1) = 1.
Now, given a contingent claim (a random variable) X, we assign it a value V (X) by
V (X) = V+(X
+)− V−(X−)
where
V+(Y ) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(Y ) > y})dy, V−(Y ) :=
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(Y ) > y})dy
for any random variable Y ≥ 0, a.s.. (Throughout this paper a+ and a− denote respectively
the positive and negative parts of a real number a.) It is evident that both V+ and V− are
non-decreasing in the sense that V±(X) ≥ V±(Y ) for any random variables X and Y with
X ≥ Y a.s.. Moreover, V+(x) = u+(x) and V−(x) = u−(x) ∀x ∈ IR+. Finally, V is also
non-decreasing.
If T+(x) = x (there is no distortion) then V+(Y ) = E[u+(Y )] (likewise with V−); hence
V+ is a generalization of the expected utility. Yet this generalization poses a fundamen-
tally different (and difficult) feature, namely, the set function T+ ◦ P is a capacity [Choquet
(1953/54)] which is a non-additive measure as opposed to the standard notion of probability.
So the definition of V+ involves the so-called Choquet integral [see Denneberg (1994) for a
comprehensive account on Choquet integrals]. Notice that with the Choquet integral the dy-
namic consistency of conditional expectation, which is the base for the dynamic programming
principle, is lost4.
In CPT the utility (or value) function u(·) is given on the whole real line, which is convex
on IR− and concave on IR+ (corresponding to the observation that people tend to be risk-averse
4The dynamic consistency refers to the following equality: E (E(X |Ft)|Fs) = E(X |Fs) if Fs ⊆ Ft. The
problem of generalizing conditional expectation to Choquet integral remains largely open, not to mention the
validity of the corresponding dynamic consistency in any sense; see Denneberg (1994, Chapter 12).
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on gains and risk-seeking on losses). Such a function is said to be of S-shaped. In our model,
we separate the utility on gains and losses by letting u+(x) := u(x) and u−(x) = −u(−x)
whenever x ≥ 0. Thus our model is equivalent to the one with an overall S-shaped utility
function.
In our model, the value V (X) is defined on a general random variableX, possibly a contin-
uous one, which is necessary for the continuous-time portfolio selection model, as opposed to
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) where only discrete random variables are treated. Moreover,
our definition of V agrees with that in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) if X is discrete [see
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, pp. 300-301)].
Under this CPT framework, our portfolio selection problem is to find the most preferable
portfolios, in terms of maximizing the value V (x(T )), by continuously managing the portfolio.
The mathematical formulation is as follows:
Maximize V (x(T ))
subject to (x(·), π(·)) satisfies (5), π(·) is admissible and tame.
(6)
In view of Proposition 2.1, in order to solve (6) one needs only first to solve the following
optimization problem in the terminal wealth, X:
Maximize V (X)
subject to E[ρX] = x0, X is an a.s. lower bounded, FT -random variable.
(7)
Once (7) is solved with a solution X∗, the optimal portfolio is then the one replicating
X∗ (as determined by Proposition 2.1). Therefore, in the rest of the paper we will focus on
Problem (7). Recall that a maximization problem is called well-posed if the supremum of its
objective is finite; otherwise it is called ill-posed. One tries to find an optimal solution only if
the problem is known a priori to be well-posed.
Remark 2.1 If the reference point at T is a general FT -measurable random variable ξ (in-
stead of 0), then, since the market is complete, we can replicate ξ by a replicating portfolio
π¯(·) with the corresponding wealth process x¯(·). [Incidentally, one can also take this case as
one where there is a dynamically and stochastically changing reference trajectory x¯(·).] In
this case, by considering x(t) − x¯(t) as the state variable the problem (6) is reduced to one
with the reference point being 0. [In view of this, the process x(·) determined by (5) actually
represents the magnitude of the change in wealth from the the price process of the terminal
reference point. In particular, this is also why the given initial state x0 in (5) can be any real
number.]
Remark 2.2 Following the discussion of Remark 2.1, we see that our model models the
situation where the investor concerns a reference wealth only at the terminal of the planning
horizon (or, equivalently, an exogenously given dynamic reference trajectory). Examples of
such a situation are when a person is to make a down payment of a house in three months
(in which case the reference point is a deterministic constant), or when an investor is to cover
the short position in a stock in one month (where the reference point is a random variable).
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It is certainly plausible that an investor will update his reference point dynamically. If the
updating rule is known a priori, such as in Berkelaar et al. (2004), then it is possible to
turn the problem into one covered by (6) by appropriately modifying some parameters. If,
however, updating the reference point is part of the overall decision, then it would lead to a
completely different and interesting model, which is open for further study.
Remark 2.3 We implicitly assume in our model that the agent is a “small investor”; so
his behavior only affects his utility function – and hence his asset allocation – but not the
overall market. This is why the budget constraint in (7), E[ρX] = x0, is still evaluated in
the conventional sense (no probability distortion). In other words, E[ρX] = x0 is the pricing
rule of the market, which is (assumed to be) not influenced by the small investor under
consideration.
Before we conclude this section, we recall the following definition. For any non-decreasing
function f : IR+ 7→ IR+, we define its inverse function
f−1(x) := inf{y ∈ IR+ : f(y) ≥ x}, x ∈ IR+. (8)
It is immediate that f−1 is non-decreasing and continuous on the left, and it holds always
that
f−1(f(y)) ≤ y.
3 Ill-Posedness
In general ill-posedness of an optimization problem signifies that the trade-off therein is not set
right, leading to a wrong model. Well-posedness is an important issue from the modeling point
of view. In classical portfolio selection literature [see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1998)] the
utility function is typically assumed to be globally concave along with other nice properties;
thus the problem is guaranteed to be well-posed in most cases5. We now demonstrate that
for the behavioral model (6) or (7) the well-posedness becomes a more significant issue, and
that probability distortions in gains and losses play prominent, yet somewhat opposite, roles.
Theorem 3.1 Problem (7) is ill-posed if there exists a nonnegative FT -measurable random
variable X such that E[ρX] < +∞ and V+(X) = +∞.
Proof: Define Y := X − c with c := (E[ρX]− x0)/Eρ. Then Y is feasible for Problem
(7). If c ≤ 0, then obviously V (Y ) = V+(Y ) ≥ V+(X) = +∞. If c > 0, then
V (Y ) = V+(Y
+)− V−(Y −)
≥ V+(Y +)− V−(c)
=
∫ +∞
0
T+
(
P{u+((X − c)+) > y}
)
dy − u−(c)
5Even with a global concave utility function the underlying problem could still be ill-posed; see counter-
examples and discussions in Korn and Kraft (2004) and Jin, Xu and Zhou (2007).
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=∫ +∞
0
T+ (P{u+(X − c) > y,X ≥ c}) dy − u−(c)
≥
∫ +∞
0
T+ (P{u+(X) > y + u+(c)}) dy − u−(c)
≥
∫ +∞
u+(c)
T+(P{u+(X) > y})dy − u−(c)
= +∞,
where we have used the fact that u+(x+ y) ≤ u+(x)+u+(y) ∀x, y ∈ IR+ due to the concavity
of u+(·) along with u+(0) = 0. The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
This theorem says that the model is ill-posed if one can find a nonnegative claim having
a finite price yet an infinite prospective value. In this case the agent can purchase such a
claim initially (by taking out a loan if necessary) and reach the infinite value at the end. The
following example shows that such an almost “unbelievable” claim could indeed exist even
with very “nice” parameters involved, so long as the probability on gains is distorted.
Example 3.1 Let ρ be such that its (probability) distribution function, F (·), is continuous
and strictly increasing, with Eρ3 < +∞ (e.g., when ρ is lognormal). Take T+(t) := t1/4 on
[0, 1/2] and u+(x) := x
1/2. Set Z := F (ρ). Then it is known that Z ∼ U(0, 1), the uniform
distribution on (0, 1). Define X := Z−1/2 − 1. Then X ≥ 0, P (X > x) = (1 + x)−2 for x ≥ 0,
and
E[ρX] = E[ρZ−1/2]− Eρ ≤ (EZ−3/4)2/3(Eρ3)1/3 −Eρ = 42/3(Eρ3)1/3 − Eρ < +∞.
However,
V+(X) ≥
∫ +∞
2
T+(P{X > y2})dy =
∫ +∞
2
T+ ((1 + y
2)−2) dy
=
∫ +∞
2
(1 + y2)−1/2dy >
∫ +∞
2
(2y2)−1/2dy = +∞.
In this example u+(x) = x
1/2 is a perfectly “nice” utility function satisfying every condi-
tion required for well-posedness (as well as solvability) of the classical utility model; yet the
distortion T+(·) ruins everything and turns the problem into an ill-posed one.
To exclude the ill-posed case identified by Theorem 3.1, we need the following assumption
throughout this paper:
Assumption 3.1 V+(X) < +∞ for any nonnegative, FT -measurable random variable X
satisfying E[ρX] < +∞.
Assumption 3.1 is not sufficient to completely rule out the ill-posedness. The following
theorem specifies another class of ill-posed problems.
Theorem 3.2 If u+(+∞) = +∞, ρ¯ = +∞, and T−(x) = x, then Problem (7) is ill-posed.
Proof: Fix any a > ρ and define X := c1ρ<a with c :=
x+0 +1
E[ρ1ρ<a]
> 0. Then for any n > 0,
V+(nX) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(nX) > y})dy
=
∫ u+(nc)
0
T+(P{u+(nc1ρ<a) > y})dy
= u+(nc)T+(P{ρ < a})→ +∞ as n→ +∞.
(9)
10
Next, for any n > 1, define Xn := cn1ρ>n2 , where cn :=
nE[ρX]−x0
E[ρ1ρ>n2 ]
. (Here E[ρ1ρ>n2 ] > 0 thanks
to ρ¯ = +∞.) Obviously, c+nP{ρ > n2} = (nE[ρX]−x0)
+
E[ρ|ρ>n2] ≤ |nE[ρX]−x0|n2 → 0 as n→ +∞. Hence
V−(c+n1ρ>n2) = u−(c
+
n )P{ρ > n2} ≤ u−(c+nP{ρ > n2})→ 0 as n→ +∞, (10)
where the last inequality is due to the facts that u−(·) is concave and u−(0) = 0.
Now, define X¯n := nX − Xn. Then E[ρX¯n] = nE[Xρ] − cnE[ρ1ρ>n2 ] = x0. Moreover,
since X¯+n ≥ nX and X¯−n ≤ c+n1ρ>n2 , it follows from (9) and (10) that V (X¯n) ≥ V+(nX) −
V−(c+n1ρ>n2)→ +∞ as n→ +∞. Q.E.D.
Remark 3.1 Quite intriguingly, Theorem 3.2 shows that a probability distortion on losses is
necessary for the well-posedness if the utility on gains can go arbitrarily large (the latter being
the case for most commonly used utility functions). The intuition behind this result and its
proof can be explained as follows: one borrows enormous amount of money to purchase a
claim with a huge payoff (nX in the proof), and then bet the market be “good” leading to
the realization of that payoff. If, for the lack of luck, the market turns out to be “bad”, then
the agent ends up with a loss (Xn); however due to the non-distortion on the loss side its
damage on value is bounded [in fact equation (10) shows that the damage can be controlled
to be arbitrarily small]. Notice that the above argument is no longer valid if the wealth is
constrained to be bounded from below6.
Now we set out to identify and solve well-posed problems.
4 Main Results
The original problem (7) is solved in two steps involving three sub-problems, which are de-
scribed in what follows.
Step 1. In this step we consider two problems respectively:
• Positive Part Problem: A problem with parameters (A, x+):
Maximize V+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(X) > y})dy
subject to E[ρX] = x+, X ≥ 0 a.s., X = 0 a.s. on AC ,
(11)
where x+ ≥ x+0 (≥ 0) and A ∈ FT are given. Thanks to Assumption 3.1, V+(X) is a
finite number for any feasible X. We define the optimal value of Problem (11), denoted
v+(A, x+), in the following way. If P (A) > 0, in which case the feasible region of (11)
is non-empty [X = (x+1A)/(ρP (A)) is a feasible solution], then v+(A, x+) is defined to
be the supremum of (11). If P (A) = 0 and x+ = 0, then (11) has only one feasible
solution X = 0 a.s. and v+(A, x+) := 0. If P (A) = 0 and x+ > 0, then (11) has no
feasible solution, where we define v+(A, x) := −∞.
6This is why in Berkelaar et al. (2004) the model is well-posed even though no probability distortion is
considered, as the wealth process there is constrained to be non-negative.
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• Negative Part Problem: A problem with parameters (A, x+):
Minimize V−(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(X) > y})dy
subject to
{
E[ρX] = x+ − x0, X ≥ 0 a.s., X = 0 a.s. on A,
X is upper bounded a.s.,
(12)
where x+ ≥ x+0 and A ∈ FT are given. Similarly to the positive part problem we define
the optimal value v−(A, x+) of Problem (12) as follows. When P (A) < 1 in which case
the feasible region of (12) is non-empty, v−(A, x+) is the infimum of (12). If P (A) = 1
and x+ = x0 where the only feasible solution is X = 0 a.s., then v−(A, x+) := 0. If
P (A) = 1 and x+ 6= x0, then there is no feasible solution, in which case we define
v−(A, x+) := +∞.
Step 2. In this step we solve
Maximize v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+)
subject to
{
A ∈ FT , x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 when P (A) = 0, x+ = x0 when P (A) = 1.
(13)
Let F (·) be the distribution function of ρ. Our main results are stated in terms of the
following mathematical program, which is intimately related to (but not the same as) Problem
(13):
Maximize v+(c, x+)− u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c])T−(1− F (c))
subject to
{
ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯, x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 when c = ρ, x+ = x0 when c = ρ¯,
(14)
where v+(c, x+) := v+({ω : ρ ≤ c}, x+) and we use the following convention:
u−
(
x+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c]
)
T−(1− F (c)) := 0 when c = ρ¯ and x+ = x0. (15)
Here go the main results of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. We have the following conclusions:
(i) If X∗ is optimal for Problem (7), then c∗ := F−1(P{X∗ ≥ 0}), x∗+ := E[ρ(X∗)+],
where F is the distribution function of ρ, are optimal for Problem (14). Moreover,
{ω : X∗ ≥ 0} and {ω : ρ ≤ c∗} are identical up to a zero probability set, and (X∗)− =
x∗+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ a.s..
(ii) If (c∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (14) and X
∗
+ is optimal for Problem (11) with pa-
rameters ({ρ ≤ c∗}, x∗+), then X∗ := (X∗)+1ρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ is optimal for Problem
(7).
In the light of Theorem 4.1, we have the following algorithm to solve Problem (7).
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Step 1 Solve Problem (11) with ({ω : ρ ≤ c}, x+), where ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯ and x+ ≥ x+0 are given, to
obtain v+(c, x+) and the optimal solution X
∗
+(c, x+).
Step 2. Solve Problem (14) to get (c∗, x∗+).
Step 3. (i) If (c∗, x∗+) = (ρ¯, x0), then X
∗
+(ρ¯, x0) solves Problem (7).
(ii) Else X∗+(c
∗, x∗+)1ρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ solves Problem (7).
We now impose the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1 F−1(z)/T ′+(z) is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1], lim infx→+∞
(−xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
)
> 0,
and E
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1( ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
)
T ′+(F (ρ))
]
< +∞.
Then v+(c, x+) and the corresponding optimal solution X
∗
+ to (11) can be expressed more
explicitly:
v+(c, x+) = E
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λ(c,x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
))
T ′+(F (ρ))1ρ≤c
]
,
X∗+ = (u
′
+)
−1
(
λ(c,x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
1ρ≤c,
where λ(c, x+) satisfies E[(u
′
+)
−1( λ(c,x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)ρ1ρ≤c] = x+. In this case Theorem 4.1 can be
re-stated with the preceding explicit expressions properly substituted.
Under Assumption 4.1, the optimal terminal wealth to our behavioral model (6) is given
explicitly as the following
X∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ(c∗, x∗+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
1ρ≤c∗ −
x∗+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ . (16)
This solution possesses some appealing features. On one hand, the terminal wealth having
a gain or a loss is completely determined by the terminal state density price being lower or
higher than a single threshold, c∗, which in turn can be obtained by solving (14). On the
other hand, (16) is the payoff of a combination of two binary options, which can be easily
priced; see Appendix E.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to proving all the above claims. But before that,
let us discuss on the economical interpretation of the optimal wealth profile (16). Indeed, (16)
suggests that an optimal strategy should deliver a wealth in excess of the reference wealth in
good states of the world (ρ ≤ c∗), and a shortfall in bad states (ρ > c∗)7. To realize this goal,
the agent should initially buy a contingent claim with the payoff (u′+)
−1
(
λ(c∗,x∗+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
1ρ≤c∗ at
cost x∗+. Since x
∗
+ ≥ x0, he needs to issue (i.e., sell) a claim with a payoff x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ to
finance the shortfall, x∗+ − x0. In other words, the agent will not only invest in stocks, but
also will generally take a leverage to do so. He then gambles on a good state of the market
turning up at the terminal time while accepting a fixed loss in case of a bad state8.
7It can be easily shown, in the case of a one-stock market, that ρ ≤ c∗ is equivalent to the stock price
exceeding a certain level.
8Such a gambling policy was derived in Berkelaar et al. (2004), Proposition 3, for a special model where
the value function is a two-piece power function and there is no probability distortion. Here, we show that
even for the most general model an optimal behavioral policy still possesses such an elegantly simple structure.
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5 Splitting
The key idea developed in this paper, i.e., splitting (7) into three sub-problems and then
appropriately merging them, is based on the following observation: If X is a feasible solution
of (7), then one can split X+ and X−. The former defines naturally an event A := {X ≥ 0}
and an initial price x+ := E[ρX
+], and the latter corresponds to AC and x+ − x0, where AC
denotes the complement of the set A. An optimal solution to (7) should, therefore, induce
the “best” such A and x+ in certain sense. We now prove that this idea indeed works in the
sense that (7) is equivalent to the three auxiliary problems combined.
We start with the well-posedness.
Proposition 5.1 Problem (7) is ill-posed if and only if Problem (13) is ill-posed.
Proof: We first show the “if” part. Suppose (13) is ill-posed. If v+(Ω, x0) = +∞, then
Problem (7) is obviously ill-posed. If v+(Ω, x0) < +∞, then for any M > v+(Ω, x0), there
exists a feasible pair (A, x+) for (13) such that v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) ≥ M . Clearly 0 <
P (A) < 1. (If P (A) = 0, then v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) ≤ 0 < M . If P (A) = 1, then
v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+) ≤ v+(Ω, x0) < M .) Consequently, both (11) and (12) with parameters
(A, x+), x+ ≥ x+0 , have non-empty feasible regions. So there exist X1 and X2 feasible for (11)
and (12) respectively such that V+(X1) ≥ v+(A, x+) − 1, V−(X2) ≤ v−(A, x+) + 1. Define
X = X1 −X2. Then X is feasible for (7), and V (X) ≥ v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+)− 2 ≥ M − 2,
implying that (13) is ill-posed.
For the “only if” part, if (7) is ill-posed, then for anyM > 0, there exists a feasible solution
X for (7) such that V (X) ≥ M . Define A := {ω : X ≥ 0}, x+ := E[ρX+]. Then (A, x+)
is feasible for Problem (13), and v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) ≥ V (X+) − V (X−) = V (X) ≥ M ,
which shows that Problem (13) is ill-posed. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.2 Given X∗, define A∗ := {ω : X∗ ≥ 0} and x∗+ := E[ρ(X∗)+]. Then X∗ is
optimal for Problem (7) if and only if (A∗, x∗+) are optimal for Problem (13) and (X
∗)+ and
(X∗)− are respectively optimal for Problems (11) and (12) with parameters (A∗, x∗+).
Proof: For the “if” part, we first have V (X∗) = v+(A∗, x∗+) − v−(A∗, x∗+). For any
feasible solution X of (7), define A := {ω : X ≥ 0} and x+ := E[ρX+]. Then we have
V+(X
+) ≤ v+(A, x+), V−(X−) ≥ v−(A, x+). Therefore V (X) = V+(X+) − V−(X−) ≤
v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) ≤ v+(A∗, x∗+) − v−(A∗, x∗+) = V (X∗), which means X∗ is optimal
for (7).
For the “only if” part, let X∗ be optimal for (7). Obviously, V+((X∗)+) ≤ v+(A∗, x∗+) and
V−((X∗)−) ≥ v−(A∗, x∗+). If the former holds strictly, then there exists X1 feasible for (11)
with parameters (A∗, x∗+) such that V+(X1) > V+((X
∗)+). As a result X¯ := X11A∗+X∗1(A∗)C
is feasible for (7) and V (X¯) > V (X∗), which contradicts the optimality of X∗. So (X∗)+ is
optimal for (11). Similarly we can prove that (X∗)− is optimal for (12). Thus v+(A∗, x∗+) =
V+((X
∗)+), v−(A∗, x∗+) = V−((X
∗)−).
Next we show that v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) ≤ v+(A∗, x∗+) − v−(A∗, x∗+) ≡ V (X∗) for any
feasible pair (A, x+) of Problem (13). This can be proved in three cases:
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(i) If P (A) = 0 (hence x+ = 0 and x0 ≤ 0), then
v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+) = −v−(A, 0)
= −v−(A, x+0 )
= sup
E[ρX]=x−0 , X≥0, X is upper bounded
[−V−(X)]
= sup
E[ρX]=−x−0 , X≤0, X is lower bounded
V (X)
≤ sup
E[ρX]=−x−0 , X is lower bounded
V (X)
= V (X∗),
where the last equality is owing to the fact that −x−0 = x0.
(ii) If P (A) = 1 (hence x+ = x0), then we need only to check v+(A, x0) ≤ V (X∗), which is
easy since v+(A, x0) = supE[ρX]=x0, X≥0 V (X).
(iii) If 0 < P (A) < 1, then for any x+ ≥ x+0 , both (11) and (12) with parameters (A, x+)
have non-empty feasible regions. Hence for any ǫ > 0 there exist X1 and X2, feasible for
(11) and (12) respectively, such that V+(X1) > (v+(A, x+)− ǫ), V−(X2) < v−(A, x+)+ ǫ.
Letting X := X1 − X2, which is feasible for (7), we have v+(A, x+) − v−(A, x+) <
V+(X1)− V−(X2) + 2ǫ = V (X) + 2ǫ ≤ V (X∗) + 2ǫ.
This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
The essential message of Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 is that our problem (7) is completely
equivalent to the set of problems (11) – (13) and, moreover, the solution to the former can
be obtained via those to the latter.
Problem (13) is an optimization problem with the decision variables being a real number,
x+, and a random event, A, the latter being very hard to handle. We now show that one needs
only to consider A = {ρ ≤ c}, where c is a real number in certain range, when optimizing
(13).
Recall that two random variables ξ and η are called comonotonic (anti-comonotonic re-
spectively) if [ξ(ω)− ξ(ω′)][η(ω)− η(ω′)] ≥ (≤ respectively) 0.
Theorem 5.1 For any feasible pair (A, x+) of Problem (13), there exists c ∈ [ρ, ρ¯] such that
A¯ := {ω : ρ ≤ c} satisfies
v+(A¯, x+)− v−(A¯, x+) ≥ v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+). (17)
Moreover, if Problem (11) admits an optimal solution with parameters (A, x+), then the in-
equality in (17) is strict unless P (A ∩ A¯C) + P (AC ∩ A¯) = 0.
Proof: The case when x+ = x
+
0 is trivial. In fact, if x0 ≤ 0, then x+ = 0 and v+(A, x+) =
0 ∀A; hence c = ρ or A¯ = Ø. If x0 > 0, then obviously v−(A, x+) = 0 ∀A; hence (17) holds
with A¯ = Ω or c = ρ¯. On the other hand, the case when P (A) = 0 or P (A) = 1 is also trivial,
where c := ρ or c := ρ¯ trivially meets (17).
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So we assume now that x+ > x
+
0 and 0 < P (A) < 1. Denote α := P (A), B := A
C . Let
A¯ = {ω : ρ ≤ c}, where c ∈ [ρ, ρ¯) satisfies P{ρ ≤ c} = α. Further, set
A1 = A ∩ {ω : ρ ≤ c}, A2 = A ∩ {ω : ρ > c},
B1 = B ∩ {ω : ρ ≤ c}, B2 = B ∩ {ω : ρ > c}.
Since P (A1 ∪B1) = P (A1 ∪ A2) ≡ α, we conclude P (A2) = P (B1).
If P (A2) = P (B1) = 0, then trivially v+(A¯, x+)− v−(A¯, x+) = v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+). So
we suppose P (A2) = P (B1) > 0. For any feasible solutions X1 and X2 for (11) and (12),
respectively, with parameters (A, x+), we are to prove that
V+(X1)− V−(X2) ≤ v+(A¯, x+)− v−(A¯, x+). (18)
To this end, define f1(t) := P{X1 ≤ t|A2}, g1(t) := P{ρ ≤ t|B1}, t ≥ 0, Z1 := g1(ρ)
and Y1 := f
−1
1 (Z1). Because ρ admits no atom with respect to P , it admits no atom with
respect to P (·|B1). Hence the distribution of Z1 conditional on B1 is U(0, 1), which implies
P{Y1 ≤ t|B1} = P{Z1 ≤ f1(t)|B1} = f1(t). Consequently,
E[ρX11A2] ≥ cE[X11A2 ] = cP (A2)E[X1|A2]
= cP (B1)
∫ +∞
0
[1− f1(t)]dt
= cP (B1)
∫ +∞
0
P{Y1 > t|B1}dt
= cE[Y11B1 ]
≥ E[ρY11B1 ],
and the inequality is strict if and only if P{X1 > 0} > 0 or f1(t) 6≡ 1.
Define
k1 :=
{
1, if Y1 = 0, a.s. on B1,
E[ρX11A2 ]
E[ρY11B1 ]
, otherwise.
Then k1 ≥ 1, and k1 > 1 if and only if f1(t) 6≡ 1. Set X¯1 := X11A1 + k1Y11B1 . Then
E[ρX1] = E[ρX11A1] + E[ρX11A2] = E[ρX11A1 ] + E[k1ρY11B1 ] = E[ρX¯1],
which means that X¯1 is feasible for (11) with parameters (A¯, x+) (recall that by definition
X¯1 = 0 on A¯
C).
On the other hand, for any t>0,
P{X¯1 > t} = P{X¯1 > t|A1}P (A1) + P{X¯1 > t|B1}P (B1)
= P{X1 > t|A1}P (A1) + P{k1Y1 > t|B1}P (B1)
≥ P{X1 > t|A1}P (A1) + P{Y1 > t|B1}P (B1)
= P{X1 > t|A1}P (A1) + P{X1 > t|A2}P (A2)
= P{X1 > t},
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and the equality holds for a.e. t ≥ 0 if and only if f1(t) ≡ 1.
It follows then by the definition of V+(·) that
V+(X¯1) ≥ V+(X1), (19)
with the inequality being strict when f1(·) 6≡ 1.
In a similar fashion we can construct X¯2 feasible for (12) with parameters (A¯, x+) satisfying
V−(X¯2) ≤ V−(X2). (20)
Combining (19) and (20) we get (18).
Now, if X1 is an optimal solution of (11) with parameters (A, x+), then P (X1 = 0|A2) < 1.
Indeed, if P (X1 = 0|A2) = 1, then by its optimality X1 is anti-comonotonic with ρ on A (see
Proposition C.1), which implies P (X1 = 0|A1) = 1. Therefore P (X1 = 0|A) = 1, and
x+ = E[ρX11A] = 0, contradicting the fact that x+ > x
+
0 ≥ 0.
Thus, f1(·) 6≡ 1. As proved earlier, (19), and hence (18), holds strictly. Q.E.D.
To simplify the notation, we now use v+(c, x+) and v−(c, x+) to denote v+({ω : ρ ≤ c}, x+)
and v−({ω : ρ ≤ c}, x+) respectively.
In view of Theorem 5.1, one may replace Problem (13) by the following problem:
Maximize v+(c, x+)− v−(c, x+)
subject to
{
ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯, x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 when c = ρ, x+ = x0 when c = ρ¯.
(21)
This is clearly a much simpler problem, being a constrained optimization problem (a mathe-
matical programming problem) in IR2.
Theorem 5.1 is one of the most important results in this paper. It discloses the form of a
general solution to the behavioral model: the optimal wealth is the payoff of a combination
of two binary options characterized by a single number c∗, as stipulated in the next theorem.
Theorem 5.2 Given X∗, and define c∗ := F−1(P{X∗ ≥ 0}), x∗+ := E[ρ(X∗)+], where
F (·) is the distribution function of ρ. Then X∗ is optimal for Problem (7) if and only if
(c∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (21) and (X
∗)+1ρ≤c∗ and (X∗)−1ρ>c∗ are respectively optimal
for Problems (11) and (12) with parameters ({ω : ρ ≤ c∗}, x∗+). Moreover, in this case
{ω : X∗ ≥ 0} and {ω : ρ ≤ c∗} are identical up to a zero probability set.
Proof: Straightforward from Proposition 5.2 and Theorem 5.1. Q.E.D.
In the following two sections, we will solve the positive and negative part problems re-
spectively to obtain v+(c, x+) and v−(c, x+). It turns out that the two problems require very
different techniques to tackle.
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6 Positive Part Problem
In this section we solve the positive part problem (11), including finding its optimal solution
and the expression of v+(c, x+), for any A = {ω : ρ ≤ c}, ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯, and x+ ≥ x+0 . In fact, it
is a special case of a more general Choquet maximization problem, which is of independent
interest and is solved in Appendix C.
6.1 Solving (11)
We apply the general results obtained in Appendix C to Problem (11) with A = {ω : ρ ≤ c}
and x+ ≥ x+0 (≥ 0). Let F (·) be the distribution function of ρ.
Let A = {ω : ρ ≤ c} be given. Problem (11) is trivial when P (A) = 0; hence we assume
P (A) > 0 or c > ρ. Define
TA(x) := T+(xP (A))/T+(P (A)), x ∈ [0, 1],
which is a strictly increasing, differentiable function from [0, 1] to [0, 1], with TA(0) = 0, TA(1) =
1. For any feasible solution X of (11) and any y ≥ 0,
T+ (P{u+(X) > y}) = T+ (P{u+(X) > y|A}P (A)) = T+(P (A))TA (P{u+(X) > y|A}) .
Now considering Problem (11) in the conditional probability space (Ω ∩A,F ∩A,PA := P (·|A)),
we can rewrite it as
Maximize V+(Y ) = T+(P (A))
∫ +∞
0
TA(PA{u+(Y ) > y})dy
subject to EA[ρY ] = x+/P (A), Y ≥ 0.
(22)
This specializes the general Choquet maximization problem (46) solved in Appendix C. It is
evident that Y ∗ is optimal for (22) if and only if X∗ = Y ∗1A is optimal for (11).
To solve Problem (11) for all A = {ω : ρ ≤ c}, we need Assumption 4.1.
Theorem 6.1 Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Given A := {ω : ρ ≤ c} with ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯, and
x+ ≥ x+0 .
(i) If x+ = 0, then the optimal solution of (11) is X
∗ = 0 and v+(c, x+) = 0.
(ii) If x+ > 0 and c = ρ, then there is no feasible solution to (11) and v+(c, x+) = −∞.
(iii) If x+ > 0 and ρ < c ≤ ρ¯, then the optimal solution to (11) is X∗(λ) = (u′+)−1
(
λρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
1ρ≤c
with the optimal value v+(c, x+) = E
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1( λρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
)
T ′+(F (ρ))1ρ≤c
]
, where λ >
0 is the unique real number satisfying E[ρX∗(λ)] = x+.
Proof: Cases (i) and (ii) are trivial. We prove (iii). Assume ρ < c ≤ ρ¯ with P (A) ≡
P{ρ ≤ c} > 0. Define FA(x) := PA{ρ ≤ x} = P{ρ≤x∧c}P{ρ≤c} = F (x∧c)P (A) , x ≥ 0. Then F−1A (x) =
F−1(xP (A)). Noting T ′A(x) =
P (A)
T+(P (A))
T ′+(xP (A)), we have
F−1A (z)
T ′A(z)
= F
−1(zP (A))
T ′+(zP (A))
T+(P (A))
P (A)
, which
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is non-decreasing in z under Assumption 4.1. Noting that ρ ≤ c on A, we have ρ
T ′A(FA(ρ))
=
ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
T+(P (A))
P (A)
. Hence, in view of Assumption 4.1 and Proposition C.2 we can apply Theorem
C.1 to conclude that the optimal solution for (22) is Y ∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ¯ρ
T ′A(FA(ρ))
)
for some λ¯ > 0.
Denoting λ := T+(P (A))
P (A)
λ¯ ≥ 0, we obtain the optimality of X∗ := Y ∗1ρ≤c in view of the relation
between Problems (22) and (11).
Finally, the optimal value of Problem (11) can be calculated as follows:
v+(c, x+) = T+(P (A))EA[u+(Y
∗)T ′A(FA(ρ))]
= P (A)EA[u+(Y
∗)T ′+(F (ρ))]
= E[u+(Y
∗)T ′+(F (ρ))1ρ≤c].
The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Theorem 6.1 remains true when the condition lim infx→+∞
(−xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
)
> 0 in Assumption
4.1 is replaced by a (mathematically) weaker one
lim sup
x→+∞
u′+(kx)
u′+(x)
< 1 for some k > 1,
which, in particular, does not require the twice differentiability of u+(·); see Jin, Xu and Zhou
(2007, Lemma 3 and Proposition 2). We choose to use the current condition due to its clear
economic meaning related to the relative risk aversion index.
Before we end this subsection, we state the following result which is useful in the sequel.
Proposition 6.1 If x+ > 0, then Problem (11) admits an optimal solution with parameters
({ρ ≤ c}, x+) only if v+(c¯, x+) > v+(c, x+) for any c¯ > c satisfying P{c < ρ ≤ c¯} > 0.
Proof: Assume c > ρ, the case c = ρ being trivial. Let X be optimal for (11) with
(A(c), x+), where A(c) := {ω : ρ ≤ c}. Then Yc := X|A(c), where X|A(c) is X restricted on
A(c), is optimal for (22) with A = A(c).
For any c¯ > c, obviously v+(c¯, x+) ≥ v+(c, x+). If v+(c¯, x+) = v+(c, x+), then, with
A(c¯) := {ω : ρ ≤ c¯}, the random variable
Y¯ (ω) :=
{
Yc(ω), if ω ∈ A(c),
0, if ω ∈ A(c¯) \ A(c)
is feasible for (22) with A = A(c¯) and, since its objective value is v+(c, x+) = v+(c¯, x+), is
optimal. By Theorem C.2, P{Y¯ = 0|A(c¯)} = 0. However, the definition of Y¯ shows that
P{Y¯ = 0|A(c¯)} > 0 if P{c < ρ ≤ c¯} > 0. This contradiction leads to v+(c¯, x+) > v+(c, x+).
Q.E.D.
In other words, v+ is strictly increasing in c.
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6.2 Discussion on the Monotonicity of F−1(z)/T ′+(z)
It is seen from the previous subsections that in order to solve the positive part problem
explicitly, a key assumption is the monotonicity of F−1(z)/T ′+(z). What is the economic in-
terpretation of this property? Does it contradict the other assumptions usually imposed on
F (·) and T+(·)? More importantly, is the set of the problem parameters satisfying this as-
sumption null in the first place? In this subsection we depart from our optimization problems
for a while to address these questions9.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that F (·) (the distribution function of ρ) is twice
differentiable and F ′(x) > 0 ∀x > 0 (e.g., when ρ is a non-degenerate lognormal random
variable). Furthermore, suppose that T+(·) is twice differentiable on (0,1).
Denote x = F−1(z) or z = F (x). Then the monotonicity (being non-decreasing) of
F−1(z)/T ′+(z) is equivalent to that T
′
+(F (x))/x is non-increasing in x > 0. Set H(x) :=
T+(F (x)), h(x) := H
′(x), and I(x) := T ′+(F (x))/x ≡ h(x)/(xF ′(x)), x > 0. Then I(x)
non-increases in x > 0 if and only if
I ′(x) =
xH ′′(x)F ′(x)− xH ′(x)F ′′(x)−H ′(x)F ′(x)
x2(F ′(x))2
≤ 0 ∀x > 0,
which is further equivalent to
xH ′′(x)
H ′(x)
− xF
′′(x)
F ′(x)
≤ 1 ∀x > 0 (23)
or
(lnH ′(x))′ ≤ (ln(xF ′(x)))′ ∀x > 0. (24)
Note that xu
′′(x)
u′(x)
can be regarded as the relative risk seeking index of a given function u(·).
On the other hand, recall that by definition H(·) is the distorted distribution function of ρ.
Hence the condition (23) can be economically interpreted as that the distortion T+ should
not be “too large” in the sense that it should not increase the relative risk seeking function
of the distribution by more than 1.
Next we are to explore more properties of the function j(·) defined by j(x) := xH′′(x)
H′(x)
−
xF ′′(x)
F ′(x)
, x > 0. To this end, let G(z) := F−1(z). Then G′(z) = 1
F ′(G(z))
∀z ∈ (0, 1). Since
T+(z) = H(G(z)), we have T
′
+(z) = h(G(z))/F
′(G(z)); hence
T ′′+(z) =
h′(G(z))F ′(G(z))− h(G(z))F ′′(G(z))
F ′(G(z))3
.
This leads to
T ′′+(F (x)) =
h′(x)F ′(x)− h(x)F ′′(x)
F ′(x)3
=
h(x)
xF ′(x)2
j(x), x > 0. (25)
As proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the probability distortion T+(·) is usually
in reversed S-shape. Specifically, T+(x) changes from being concave to being convex when x
goes from 0 to 1, or T ′′+(x) changes from negative to positive. It follows then from (25) that
9The reader may skip this subsection without interrupting the flow of reading.
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j(·) changes from negative to positive when x goes from 0 to 1, while as shown earlier (23)
requires that j(·) is bounded above by 1.
To summarize, a reversed S-shaped distortion T+(·) satisfying the monotonicity condition
in Assumption 4.1 if there exists c0 > 0 such that
j(x) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ (0, c0], and 0 ≤ j(x) ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ (c0,+∞). (26)
The following is an example of distortion where the corresponding j(·) does satisfy (26).
Example 6.1 Let ρ be a non-degenerate lognormal random variable; i.e., F (x) = N
(
lnx−µ
σ
)
for some µ ∈ IR and σ > 0, where N(·) is the distribution function of a standard normal
random variable. Take j(x) =: a10<x≤c0 + b1x>c0, with c0 > 0, a < 0 and 0 < b < 1 all given.
This is the “simplest” function satisfying (26). We now track down the distortion T+(·) that
produces the function j(·).
When 0 < x ≤ c0, j(x) ≡ x [(lnH ′(x))′ − (lnF ′(x))′] = a. Hence
lnH ′(x)− lnF ′(x) = k¯ + a lnx
for some constant k¯, or
H ′(x) = kF ′(x)xa =
k√
2πσ
xa−1e−(lnx−µ)
2/(2σ2), 0 < x ≤ c0, (27)
for some constant k. Thus,
H(x) = k√
2πσ
∫ x
0
ta−1e−(ln t−µ)
2/(2σ2)dt
= k√
2πσ
∫ lnx
−∞ e
ase−(s−µ)
2/(2σ2)ds
= k√
2πσ
eaµ+a
2σ2/2
∫ lnx
−∞ e
−(s−(µ+aσ2))2/(2σ2)ds
= keaµ+a
2σ2/2N
(
lnx−(µ+aσ2)
σ
)
, 0 < x ≤ c0.
(28)
Consequently,
T+(z) ≡ H(F−1(z)) = keaµ+a2σ2/2N
(
N−1(z)− aσ) , 0 < z ≤ F (c0) := z0.
When x > c0, similar to (27) we have
H ′(x) =
k˜√
2πσ
xb−1e−(lnx−µ)
2/(2σ2), x > c0, (29)
with k˜ = ca−b0 k (to render H
′(x) continuous at x = c0). Therefore,
H(x) = H(c0) +
k˜√
2πσ
∫ x
c0
tb−1e−(ln t−µ)
2/(2σ2)dt
= H(c0) +
k˜√
2πσ
∫ lnx
ln c0
ebse−(s−µ)2/(2σ2)ds
= H(c0) +
k˜√
2πσ
ebµ+b
2σ2/2
∫ lnx
ln c0
e−(s−(µ+bσ
2))2/(2σ2)ds
= H(c0) + k˜e
bµ+b2σ2/2
[
N
(
lnx−(µ+bσ2)
σ
)
−N
(
ln c0−(µ+bσ2)
σ
)]
, x > c0.
(30)
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This leads to
T+(z) = H(F
−1(z))
= keaµ+a
2σ2/2N (N−1(z0)− aσ) + k˜ebµ+b2σ2/2 [N (N−1(z)− bσ)−N (N−1(z0)− aσ)] ,
z0 < z ≤ 1.
In particular,
T+(1) = ke
aµ+a2σ2/2N (N−1(z0)− aσ) + k˜ebµ+b2σ2/2 [1−N (N−1(z0)− aσ)]
= keaµ+a
2σ2/2N
(
ln c0−µ−aσ2
σ
)
+ kca−b0 e
bµ+b2σ2/2
[
1−N
(
ln c0−µ−aσ2
σ
)]
.
This, in turn, determines uniquely the value of k since T+(1) = 1.
So, in this example we have constructed a class of distortions T+ parameterized by z0 =
F−1(c0) ∈ (0, 1), a < 0 and b ∈ (0, 1). These distortions are reversed S-shaped, and satisfy
the monotonicity condition in Assumption 4.1.
The expressions of H(·) given in (28) and (30) show that the distortion T+(·) in ef-
fect distorts the distribution of ρ, a lognormal random variable, into one having lognormal
components, albeit with enlarged means and rescaled values. On the other hand, as stip-
ulated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), a probability distortion on gain usually satisfies
T ′+(0) = T
′
+(1) = +∞, reflecting the observation that there are most significant distortions
on very small and very large probabilities. It turns out that the distortion functions con-
structed in the preceding example do indeed satisfy T ′+(0) = T
′
+(1) = +∞. To see this,
notice T ′+(z) = T
′
+(F (x)) = H
′(x)/F ′(x) = kxj(x) or k˜xj(x). Hence, when z → 0, x→ 0, and
T ′+(z) → +∞. On the other hand, when z → 1, x→ +∞, and T ′+(z) → +∞.
7 Negative Part Problem
Now we turn to the negative part problem (12), which is a Choquet minimization problem.
Such a problem in a more general setting is solved thoroughly in Appendix D; so we need only
to apply the results there to (12). Notice, though, (12) has a constraint that a feasible solution
must be almost surely bounded from above. The reason we do not include this constraint
explicitly into the general problem (51) is that, under a mild condition, any optimal solution
to (51) is automatically almost surely bounded from above; see Proposition D.2 and the
comments right after it.
Similarly with the positive part problem, for a given A = {ω : ρ ≤ c} with ρ ≤ c < ρ¯
(the case when c = ρ¯ is trivial), we define TAC (x) :=
T−(xP (AC))
T−(P (AC))
. Then TAC (·) is a strictly
increasing, differentiable function from [0, 1] to [0, 1] with TAC (0) = 0, TAC (1) = 1. Moreover,
for any feasible solution X of (12) and any y ≥ 0,
T−(P{u−(X) > y}) = T−
(
P{u−(X) > y|AC}P (AC)
)
= T−(P (AC))TAC (P{u−(X) > y|AC}).
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Define the probability measure PAC (·) = P (·|AC). Then Problem (12), taken in the probabil-
ity space
(
Ω ∩ AC ,F ∩AC , PAC
)
, is equivalent to
Minimize V−(Y ) = T−(P (AC))
∫ +∞
0
TAC (PAC{u−(Y ) > y})dy
subject to EAC [ρY ] = (x+ − x0)/P (AC), Y ≥ 0, Y is bounded a.s..
(31)
This is a special case of (51) in Appendix D.
Theorem 7.1 Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. Given A := {ω : ρ ≤ c} with
ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ¯, and x+ ≥ x+0 .
(i) If c = ρ¯ and x+ = x0, then the optimal solution of (12) is X
∗ = 0 and v−(c, x+) = 0.
(ii) If c = ρ¯ and x+ 6= x0, then there is no feasible solution to (12) and v−(c, x+) = +∞.
(iii) If ρ ≤ c < ρ¯, then v−(c, x+) = inf c¯∈[c,ρ¯) u−
(
x+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯]
)
T− (1− F (c¯)). Moreover, Problem
(12) with parameters (A, x+) admits an optimal solution X
∗ if and only if the following
minimization problem
min
c¯∈[c,ρ¯)
u−
(
x+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯]
)
T− (1− F (c¯)) (32)
admits an optimal solution c¯∗, in which case X∗ = x+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯∗ ]
1ρ>c¯∗, a.s..
Proof: Cases (i) and (ii) are trivial. On the other hand, given Theorem D.1, and noticing
that X∗ = x+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯∗ ]
1c¯∗≤ρ<c is automatically bounded, we can prove (iii) similarly to that for
Theorem 6.1. Q.E.D.
8 Proof of Main Results
Now that we have solved the problems of the positive and negative parts in Step 1, we are
ready to solve our ultimate Problem (7) via the optimization Problem (13) or equivalently,
Problem (21), in Step 2, and hence prove the main results contained in Theorem 4.1.
Recall problem (14) formulated earlier. The following lemma is straightforward by Theo-
rem 7.1 and the convention (15).
Lemma 8.1 For any feasible pair (c, x+) for Problem (21), u−
(
x+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c]
)
T−(1 − F (c)) ≥
v−(c, x+).
Proposition 8.1 Problems (21) and (14) have the same supremum values.
Proof: Denote by α and β the supremum values of (21) and (14) respectively. By Lemma
8.1, α ≥ β. Conversely, we prove α ≤ β. First we assume that α < +∞. For any ǫ > 0,
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there exists (c, x+) feasible for (21) such that v+(c, x+)− v−(c, x+) ≥ α− ǫ, and there exists
c¯ ∈ [c, ρ¯] such that u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c¯])T−(1− F (c¯)) ≤ v−(c, x+) + ǫ. Therefore
v+(c¯, x+)− u−
(
x+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯]
)
T−(1− F (c¯)) ≥ v+(c¯, x+)− v−(c, x+)− ǫ
≥ v+(c, x+)− v−(c, x+)− ǫ
≥ α− 2ǫ.
Letting ǫ→ 0, we conclude α ≤ β.
Next, if α = +∞, then for any M ∈ IR, there exists a feasible pair (c, x+) such that
v+(c, x+)−v−(c, x+) ≥ M , and there is c¯ ≥ c with u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c¯])T−(1−F (c¯)) ≤ v−(c, x+)+M/2.
Thus v+(c¯, x+)−u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c¯])T−(1−F (c¯)) ≥ v+(c, x+)−v−(c, x+)−M/2 ≥M/2, which implies
that β = +∞. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: (i) If X∗ is optimal for (7), then by Theorem 5.2 (c∗, x∗+) is
optimal for (21) and (X∗)+1ρ≤c∗ and (X∗)−1ρ>c∗ are respectively optimal for Problems (11)
and (12) with parameters ({ω : ρ ≤ c∗}, x∗+). We now show that with (c, x+) = (c∗, x∗+) the
minimum in (32) is achieved at c¯ = c∗, namely,
v−(c∗, x∗+) = u−(
x∗+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
)T−(1− F (c∗)). (33)
To this end, we first assume that x∗+ = 0 (hence X
∗ = 0 a.s. and c∗ = ρ¯). Then x0 ≤ x∗+ = 0.
If x0 = 0, then (33) is trivial. If x0 < 0, Theorem 7.1 yields that (X
∗)−1ρ>c∗ has the following
representation
(X∗)−1ρ>c∗ =
x∗+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯∗ ]
1ρ>c¯∗ , a.s.. (34)
Recall X∗ < 0 on ρ > c∗, and
x∗+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯∗ ]
> 0; so (34) implies c∗ = c¯∗, and hence (33), in view
of Theorem 7.1.
Next, if x∗+ > 0, then by Proposition 6.1, we have v+(c¯, x
∗
+) > v+(c
∗, x∗+) for any c¯ > c
∗
with P{c∗ < ρ ≤ c¯} > 0. If (33) is not true, then it follows from Theorem 7.1 that there
exists c¯ > c∗ with P{c∗ < ρ ≤ c¯} > 0 such that v−(c∗, x∗+) = u−( x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯]
)T−(1 − F (c¯)).
Consequently,
v+(c¯, x
∗
+)− v−(c¯, x∗+) ≥ v+(c¯, x∗+)− u−( x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c¯]
)T−(1− F (c¯))
> v+(c
∗, x∗+)− v−(c∗, x∗+),
violating the conclusion that (c∗, x∗+) is optimal for (21).
Now, for any (c, x+) feasible for (14),
v+(c, x+)− u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c])T−(1− F (c))
≤ v+(c, x+)− v−(c, x+)
≤ v+(c∗, x∗+)− v−(c∗, x∗+)
= v+(c
∗, x∗+)− u−( x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
)T−(1− F (c∗)),
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implying that (c∗, x∗+) is optimal for (14). The other conclusions are straightforward.
(ii) Since (c∗, x∗+) is optimal for (14), we have
v+(c
∗, x∗+)− v−(c∗, x∗+) ≥ v+(c∗, x∗+)− u−( x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
)T−(1− F (c∗))
= sup
[
v+(c, x+)− u−( x+−x0E[ρ1ρ>c])T−(1− F (c))
]
= sup [v+(c, x+)− v−(c, x+)] ,
where the supremum is over the feasible region of (14). This implies that (c∗, x∗+) is optimal
for (21) and the inequality above is in fact an equality, resulting in
v−(c∗, x∗+) = u−(
x∗+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
)T−(1− F (c∗)).
The above in turn indicates, thanks to Theorem 7.1, that X∗− :=
x∗+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ is optimal for
(12) with parameters ({ω : ρ ≤ c∗}, x∗+). The desired result then follows from Theorem 5.2.
Q.E.D.
Other claims in Section 4 on more explicit conclusions under Assumption 4.1 are straight-
forward by virtue of Theorem 6.1.
9 An Example with Two-Piece CRRA Utility Func-
tions
In this section we solve a concrete (and very involved) example to demonstrate the general
results obtained in previous section as well as the algorithm presented. The example showcases
all the possibilities associated with our behavioral portfolio selection model (6), namely, a
model could be ill-posed, or well-posed yet optimal solution not attainable, or well-posed
and optimal solution obtainable. When the optimal solutions do exist, we are able to derive
explicit terminal payoffs for most of the cases.
In the example, we let ρ follow the lognormal distribution, i.e., ln ρ ∼ N(µ, σ) with σ > 0,
and the utility functions be CRRA (constant relative risk aversion), i.e., u+(x) = x
α, u−(x) =
k−xα, x ≥ 0, with k− > 0 and 0 < α < 1. (Recall the overall utility function – or value
function in the terminology of Tversky and Kahneman – is an S-shaped function.) These
functions, also taken in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with α = 0.88 and k− = 2.25, clearly
satisfy Assumption 2.3. We do not spell out (neither do we need) the explicit forms of the
distortions T+(·) and T−(·) so long as they satisfy Assumption 2.4. In addition, we assume that
Assumption 4.1 holds, which is imposed on T+(·). An example of such T+(·) was presented
in Example 6.1.
Clearly, u′+(x) = αx
α−1, (u′+)
−1(y) = (y/α)1/(α−1), u+((u′+)
−1(y)) = (y/α)α/(α−1), ρ = 0,
ρ¯ = +∞, and F (x) = N ((ln x− µ)/σ).
Under this setting, we first want to solve the positive part problem (11) with given (c, x+),
where 0 ≤ c ≤ +∞ and x+ ≥ x+0 . The case that c = 0 is trivial, where necessarily x+ = 0 in
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order to have a feasible problem, and v+(c, x+) = 0. So let c ∈ (0,+∞]. The optimal solution
to (11) in this case is
X∗+(c, x+) = (u
′
+)
−1
(
λ(c, x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
1ρ≤c =
(
λ(c, x+)ρ
αT ′+(F (ρ))
)1/(α−1)
1ρ≤c.
To determine λ(c, x+), denote
ϕ(c) := E
[(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
ρ1ρ≤c
]
> 0, 0 < c ≤ +∞.
Then the constraint x+ = E[ρX
∗
+(c, x+)] = ϕ(c)
(
λ(c,x+)
α
)1/(α−1)
gives
λ(c, x+) = α
(
x+
ϕ(c)
)α−1
, 0 < c ≤ +∞, x+ ≥ x+0 .
This in turn determines
X∗+(c, x+) =
x+
ϕ(c)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
1ρ≤c, 0 < c ≤ +∞, x+ ≥ x+0 , (35)
and
v+(c, x+) =
(
x+
ϕ(c)
)α
E
[(
ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)α/(α−1)−1
ρ1ρ≤c
]
=
(
x+
ϕ(c)
)α
ϕ(c)
= ϕ(c)1−αxα+, 0 < c ≤ +∞, x+ ≥ x+0 .
(36)
Set ϕ˜(c) =
{
ϕ(c) if 0 < c ≤ +∞,
0 if c = 0,
which is a non-decreasing function right continuous at
0. Then Problem (14) specializes to
Maximize v(c, x+) = ϕ˜(c)
1−αxα+ − k−T−(1−F (c))(E[ρ1ρ>c])α (x+ − x0)α,
subject to
{
0 ≤ c ≤ +∞, x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 when c = 0, x+ = x0 when c = +∞.
(37)
When c > 0 (excluding +∞) and x+ ≥ x+0 , write
v(c, x+) = ϕ(c)
1−α[xα+ − k(c)(x+ − x0)α],
where k(c) := k−T−(1−F (c))
ϕ(c)1−α(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
> 0, c > 0.
We study the underlying portfolio selection problem in two cases, depending on whether
the initial wealth represents a gain or a loss.
Theorem 9.1 Assume that x0 ≥ 0 and Assumption 4.1 holds.
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(i) If infc>0 k(c) ≥ 1, then the optimal portfolio for Problem (6) is the replicating portfolio
for the contingent claim
X∗ =
x0
ϕ(+∞)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
.
(ii) If infc>0 k(c) < 1, then Problem (6) is ill-posed.
Proof: Consider the problem maxx≥x0 f(x) where f(x) = x
α − k(x − x0)α and k ≥ 0
fixed. Since f ′(x) = α[xα−1 − k(x − x0)α−1], we conclude that 1) if k ≥ 1, then f ′(x) ≤
0 ∀x ≥ x0; therefore x∗ = x0 is optimal with the optimal value xα0 ; and 2) if k < 1, then
f(x) = xα[1− k(1− x0/x)α]→ +∞ as x→ +∞, implying that supx≥x0 f(x) = +∞.
(i) If infc>0 k(c) ≥ 1, then
supc>0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) ≡ supc>0
[
ϕ(c)1−α supx+≥x0
(
xα+ − k(c)(x+ − x0)α
)]
= supc>0[ϕ(c)
1−αxα0 ] = ϕ(+∞)1−αxα0 ≡ v+(+∞, x0) ≥ 0.
However, when c = 0 (and hence x+ = 0) we have v(c, x+) = 0. As a result (c
∗, x∗+) =
(+∞, x0) is optimal to (37). Theorem 4.1 then applies to conclude that X∗ ≡ X∗+(+∞, x0) =
x0
ϕ(+∞)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
solves (7). Hence the optimal portfolio for (6) is the one that replicates
X∗.
(ii) If infc>0 k(c) < 1, then there is c0 > 0 such that k(c0) < 1. In this case,
sup
c>0,x+≥x+0
v(c, x+) ≥ j(c0)α sup
x+≥x0
[
xα+ − k(c0)(x+ − x0)α
]
= +∞.
The conclusion thus follows from Propositions 8.1 and 5.1. . Q.E.D.
Theorem 9.2 Assume that x0 < 0 and Assumption 4.1 holds.
(i) If infc>0 k(c) > 1, then Problem (6) is well-posed. Moreover, (6) admits an optimal
portfolio if and only if
argminc≥0
[(
k−T−(1− F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ˜(c)
]
6= Ø. (38)
Furthermore, if c∗ > 0 is one of the minimizers in (38), then the optimal portfolio is
the one to replicate
X∗ =
x∗+
ϕ(c∗)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
1ρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+ − x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ , (39)
where x∗+ :=
−x0
k(c∗)1/(1−α)−1 ; and if c
∗ = 0 is the unique minimizer in (38), then the unique
optimal portfolio is the one to replicate X∗ = x0
Eρ
.
(ii) If infc>0 k(c) = 1, then the supremum value of Problem (6) is 0, which is however not
achieved by any admissible portfolio.
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(iii) If infc>0 k(c) < 1, then Problem (6) is ill-posed.
Proof: We first consider a general optimization problem maxx≥0 f(x) where f(x) :=
xα − k(x− x0)α and k ≥ 0 fixed. We solve it in the following three cases.
1) If k > 1, then f ′(x) = 0 has the only solution x∗ = −x0
k1/(1−α)−1 > 0. Since f
′′(x) =
α(α − 1)[xα−2 − k(x − x0)α−2] < 0 ∀x > 0, x∗ is the (only) maximum point with the
maximum value
f(x∗) = (x∗)α[1− k(1− x0/x)α] = −(−x0)α[k1/(1−α) − 1]1−α.
2) If k = 1, then f ′(x) > 0 ∀x > 0. This means that the supremum of f(x) on x ≥ 0 is
limx→+∞ f(x) = 0; yet this value is not achieved by any x ≥ 0.
3) If k < 1, then f(x) = xα[1 − k(1 − x0/x)α] → +∞ as x → +∞, implying that
supx≥0 f(x) = +∞.
We need to solve (37) to obtain (c∗, x∗+). Since x0 < 0, c = +∞ is infeasible; so we
restrict c ∈ [0,+∞). Care must be taken to deal with the special solution (c, x+) = (0, 0)
with v(0, 0) = − k−
(E[ρ])α
(−x0)α.
(i) If infc>0 k(c) > 1, then
supc>0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) ≡ supc>0
[
ϕ(c)1−α supx+≥0
(
xα+ − k(c)(x+ − x0)α
)]
= supc>0
[
−(−x0)αϕ(c)1−α
(
k(c)1/(1−α) − 1)1−α]
= −(−x0)α
{
infc>0
[(
k−T−(1−F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ(c)
]}1−α
< +∞.
(40)
This yields that (6) is well-posed. Now, if c∗ > 0 achieve the infimum of
[(
k−T−(1−F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ˜(c)
]
over c ≥ 0, then we have supc>0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) ≥ −(−x0)α
k−
(Eρ)α
= v(0, 0), which means c∗ > 0
and x∗+ =
−x0
k(c∗)1/(1−α)−1 are optimal for (37). Theorem 4.1 then yields that the optimal portfolio
is the one that replicates X∗ given by (39).
If c∗ = 0 is the unique infimum of
[(
k−T−(1−F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ˜(c)
]
over c ≥ 0, then
sup
c>0,x+≥x+0
v(c, x+) = −(−x0)α
{
inf
c>0
[(
k−T−(1− F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ(c)
]}1−α
< −(−x0)α k−
(Eρ)α
≡ v(0, 0).
This implies that (c∗, x∗+) = (0, 0) is uniquely optimal for (37), and the unique optimal solution
for (7) is X∗+(c
∗, x∗+)1ρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+−x0
E[ρ1ρ>c∗ ]
1ρ>c∗ ≡ x0Eρ , for which the corresponding replicating
portfolio is the risk-free one.
If the infimum infc≥0
[(
k−T−(1−F (c))
(E[ρ1ρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ˜(c)
]
is not attainable, then
supc>0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) > −
k−
(E[ρ])α
(−x0)α = v(0, 0). This means that (0, 0) is not optimal for
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(37). On the other hand, the optimality of (37) is not achieved at any c > 0 and x+ ≥ 0 in
view of (40). It then follows from Theorem 4.1 that (6) admits no optimal solution.
(ii) Next consider the case when infc>0 k(c) = 1. If k(c) > 1 for any c > 0, then
sup
c>0,x+≥x+0
v(c, x+) = −(−x0)α{ϕ(c)1−α[(inf
c>0
k(c))1/(1−α) − 1]1−α} = 0.
Yet, for any c > 0, x+ ≥ 0, v(c, x+) ≤ maxx+≥0 v(c, x+) = −(−x0)α[ϕ(c)1−α(k(c)1/(1−α) −
1)1−α] < 0. Also, v(0, 0) < 0. Therefore the optimal value is not attainable.
On the other hand, if there exists c∗ > 0 such that k(c∗) = 1, then supc≥0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) ≥
supx+≥0 v(c
∗, x+) = 0. However, v(c, x+) = ϕ(c)1−α[xα+ − k(c)(x+ − x0)α] ≤ ϕ(c)1−α[xα+ −
(x+ − x0)α] < 0 ∀c > 0, x+ ≥ 0. Together with the fact that v(0, 0) < 0 we conclude that
supc≥0,x+≥x+0 v(c, x+) = 0, which is however not achieved.
(iii) If infc≥0 k(c) < 1, then there exists c0 such that k(c0) < 1. As a result, v(c0, x+) =
ϕ(c0)
1−α[xα+ − k(c0)(x+ − x0)α]→ +∞ as x+ → +∞. Q.E.D.
We see that the key features of the underlying behavioral portfolio selection problem
critically depend on the value infc>0 k(c). Recall that k(c), by its definition, reflects in a
precise way the coordination among the utility functions, the probability distortions, and
the market (represented by ρ). Let us elaborate on one particular point. In Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), the parameters are taken, based on extensive experiments, to be α = 0.88,
and k− = 2.25 > 1, the latter reflecting the fact that losses loom larger than gains: the
pain associated with a loss is typically larger than the pleasure associated with an equivalent
gain10. Now, by the definition of k(c) we see the larger the loss aversion the more likely the
underlying model is well-posed and solvable. The economic intuition behind this is that with
a larger loss aversion coefficient it is not optimal to allocate all the fund to stocks (because
stocks are risky and prone to losses), and hence one needs to carefully balance the investment
between risky and risk-free assets, leading to a meaningful model.
Another interesting observation is that the optimal portfolios behave fundamentally dif-
ferent depending on whether x0 > 0 (Theorem 9.1) or x0 < 0 (Theorem 9.2). Recall that the
state 0 here really means the reference point (e.g., the present value of a future liability that
must be fulfilled); therefore the two situations correspond to whether the investor starts with
a gain or loss situation. If x0 > 0, then the optimal strategy is simply to spend x0 buying
a contingent claim that delivers a payoff in excess of the reference point, reminiscent of a
classical utility maximizing agent (although the allocation to stocks is “distorted” due to the
probability distortion). If x0 < 0, then the investor starts off a loss situation and needs to
get “out of the hole” soonest possible. As a result, the optimal strategy is a gambling policy
which involves raising additional capital to purchase a claim that delivers a higher payoff in
the case of a good state of the market and incurs a fixed loss in the case of a bad one. Finally,
if x0 = 0, then the optimal portfolio is not to invest in risky asset at all. Notice that x0 = 0
corresponds to a natural psychological reference point – the risk-free return – for many people.
This, nonetheless, does explain why most households do not invest in equities at all11.
10k− is the so-called loss aversion coefficient.
11A similar result is derived in Gomes (2005) for his portfolio selection model with loss averse investors,
albeit in the single-period setting without probability distortions.
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10 How Behavioral Criterion Affects Risky Allocation
Along the line of the discussions at the end of the last section we would like to investigate
more on how exactly the behavioral criterion would affect the wealth allocation to risky assets.
This is best explained through a very concrete example, where an optimal portfolio (not just
optimal terminal payoff) is explicitly available. We consider a model with the power utility
u+(x) = x
α, u−(x) = k−xα, and all the market parameters (investment opportunity set) are
time-invariant: r(·) ≡ r, B(·) = B, σ(t) = σ, θ(·) = θ. In this case ρ(t, T ) := ρ(T )/ρ(t), given
Ft, follows a lognormal distribution with parameter (µt, σ2t ), where
µt := −(r + θ2/2)(T − t), σ2t := θ2(T − t). (41)
Furthermore, we set the distortion T+ to be the one in Example 6.1 with j(x) =: a10<x≤c0 +
b1x>c0 , where c0 > 0, a < 0 and 0 < b < 1.
We now derive in closed-form the optimal portfolio under the setting of Theorem 9.1-(i),
i.e., x0 ≥ 0 and infc>0 k(c) ≥ 1. (Other cases can also be done, which are left to interested
readers.)
Theorem 10.1 Under the assumption of Theorem 9.1-(i), the optimal wealth-portfolio pair
(x∗(·), π∗(·)) for Problem (6) is
x∗(t) =
x0
γ
[x1(t) + c
(a−b)/(1−α)
0 x
2(t)],
π∗(t) =
x0
γ
[
(1− a)x1(t) + c(a−b)/(1−α)0 (1− b)x2(t)
1− α
]
(σσ′)−1B,
where ψ(y) := (2π)−1/2e−y
2/2 is the density function of a standard normal distribution, and
x1(t) := ρ(t)
(a−1)/(1−α)
σt
∫ c0/ρ(t)
0
y(a−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt
σt
)
dy ≡ 1
σtρ(t)
∫ c0
0
y(a−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt−ln ρ(t)
σt
)
dy,
x2(t) := ρ(t)
(b−1)/(1−α)
σt
∫ +∞
c0/ρ(t)
y(b−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt
σt
)
dy ≡ 1
σtρ(t)
∫ +∞
c0
y(b−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt−ln ρ(t)
σt
)
dy,
γ := E
[
ρ(a−α)/(1−α)1ρ≤c0 + c
(a−b)/(1−α)
0 ρ
(b−α)/(1−α)1ρ>c0
]
.
Proof: It follows from (27) and (29) that
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
≡ H
′(ρ)
ρF ′(ρ)
= kρa−11ρ≤c0 + kc
a−b
0 ρ
b−11ρ>c0,
where k−1 = eaµ0+a
2σ20/2N(
ln c0−µ0−aσ20
σ0
) + ca−b0 e
bµ0+b2σ20/2[1−N( ln c0−µ0−aσ20
σ0
)]. Hence
ϕ(+∞) := E
[(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
) 1
1−α
ρ
]
= k
1
1−αE
[
ρ
a−α
1−α1ρ≤c0 + c
a−b
1−α
0 ρ
b−α
1−α1ρ>c0
]
= k
1
1−αγ.
Appealing to Theorem 9.1-(i) the optimal portfolio is the replicating portfolio for the claim
X∗ =
x0
γ
[ρ(a−1)/(1−α)1ρ≤c0 + c
(a−b)/(1−α)
0 ρ
(b−1)/(1−α)1ρ>c0].
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Let (x1(·), π1(·)) replicate ρ(a−1)/(1−α)1ρ≤c0 and (x2(·), π2(·)) replicate ρ(b−1)/(1−α)1ρ>c0 . Then
the results in Appendix B yield
x1(t) =
ρ(t)(a−1)/(1−α)
σt
∫ c0/ρ(t)
0
y(a−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y − µt
σt
)
dy,
π1(t) = −
[
a− 1
1− αx
1(t)− 1
σtρ(t)
c
(a−α)/(1−α)
0 ψ
(
ln c0 − µt − ln ρ(t)
σt
)]
(σσ′)−1B,
x2(t) =
ρ(t)(b−1)/(1−α)
σt
∫ +∞
c0/ρ(t)
y(b−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y − µt
σt
)
dy,
π2(t) = −
[
b− 1
1− αx
2(t) +
1
σtρ(t)
c
(b−α)/(1−α)
0 ψ
(
ln c0 − µt − ln ρ(t)
σt
)]
(σσ′)−1B.
Combining these two portfolios linearly we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
Now consider the case when c0 = 1 for ease of exposition. In this case the optimal portfolio
can be simplified to be
π∗(t) =
x0
γ
[
(1− a)x1(t) + (1− b)x2(t)
1− α
]
(σσ′)−1B
=
(1− a)x1(t) + (1− b)x2(t)
x1(t) + x2(t)
x∗(t)
1− α(σσ
′)−1B
=
(
1− ax
1(t) + bx2(t)
x1(t) + x2(t)
)
x∗(t)
1− α(σσ
′)−1B,
or the optimal ratio in risky assets is
π∗(t)
x∗(t)
= (1− α)−1
(
1− ax
1(t) + bx2(t)
x1(t) + x2(t)
)
(σσ′)−1B. (42)
Recall that in the conventional expected utility model with the utility function u(x) = xα
and without distortion, the optimal ratio in risky assets is
πˆ(t)
xˆ(t)
= (1− α)−1(σσ′)−1B. (43)
So when
b
−a >
x1(t)
x2(t)
=
∫ 1
0
y(a−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt−lnρ(t)
σt
)
dy∫ +∞
1
y(b−1)/(1−α)ψ
(
ln y−µt−ln ρ(t)
σt
)
dy
,
the investor underweights the risky assets in her portfolio compared with the one dictated by
the conventional utility model, and vice versa.
11 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduce, for the first time in literature to our best knowledge, a general
continuous-time portfolio selection model within the framework of the cumulative prospect
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theory, so as to account for human psychology and emotions in investment activities. The
model features inherent difficulties, including non-convex/concave and non-smooth (overall)
utility functions and probability distortions. Even the well-posedness of such a model be-
comes more an exception than a rule: we demonstrate that a well-posed model calls for a
careful coordination among the underlying market, the utility function, and the probability
distortions. We then develop an approach to solving the model thoroughly. The approach is
largely different from the existing ones employed in the conventional dynamic asset allocation
models. Notwithstanding the complexity of the approach, the final solution turns out to be
simply structured: the optimal terminal payoff is related to certain binary options character-
ized by a single number, and the optimal strategy is an aggressive gambling policy betting
on good states of the market. Finally, we apply the general results to a specific case with a
two-piece CRRA utility function, and show how the behavioral criterion will change the risky
allocation.
The equity premium puzzle [Mehra and Prescott (1985)] refers to the phenomenon that
observed average annual returns on stocks over the past century are higher by large margin
(approximately 6 percentage points) than returns on government bonds, whereas standard
asset allocation theories (such as that based on the utility model) predict that the difference
in returns between these two investments should be much smaller. Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) proposed an explanation for the puzzle using prospect theory (in single period and
without probability distortion). In Section 10 we demonstrate that the investor would indeed
underweight stocks in her portfolio under certain conditions. We are not claiming that we
have provided a satisfactory explanation to the equity premium puzzle in the continuous time
setting; but we do hope that the research along the line will shed lights on eventually solving
the puzzle.
It should be emphasized again that the agent under study in this paper is a “small investor”
in that his behavior will not affect the market. Hence we can still comfortably assume some
market properties, such as the absence of arbitrage and the market completeness, as usually
imposed for the conventional utility model. (It remains an interesting problem to study
a behavioral model in an incomplete market.) It is certainly a fascinating and challenging
problem to study how the overall market might be changed by the joint behaviors of investors;
e.g., a “behavioral” capital asset pricing model.
Let us also mention about an on-going work [He and Zhou (2007)] on behavioral portfolio
choice in single period, featuring both S-shaped utilities and probability distortions. Per-
versely, the single-period model is equally difficult, and calls for a technique quite different
from its continuous-time counterpart to tackle. Only some special cases have been solved,
which are used to study the equity premium puzzle more closely.
To conclude, this work is meant to be initiating and inspiring, rather than exhaustive and
conclusive, for the research on intertemporal behavioral portfolio allocation.
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Appendix
A An Inequality
Lemma A.1 Let f : IR+ 7→ IR+ be a non-decreasing function with f(0) = 0. Then
xy ≤
∫ x
0
f−1(t)dt +
∫ y
0
f(t)dt ∀x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0,
and the equality holds if and only if f(y−) ≤ x ≤ f(y+).
Proof: By interpreting the integrations involved as the appropriate areas, we have∫ y
0
f(t)dt = yf(y)−
∫ f(y)
0
f−1(t)dt.
Define g(x, y) :=
∫ x
0 f
−1(t)dt +
∫ y
0 f(t)dt− xy. Then
g(x, y) = y(f(y)− x) +
∫ x
f(y)
f−1(t)dt =
∫ x
f(y)
(f−1(t)− y)dt.
We now consider all the possible cases. First, if x < f(y−), then f−1(t) ≤ y ∀t < f(y). Therefore
g(x, y) =
∫ f(y)
x (y − f−1(t))dt ≥ 0. Moreover, in this case there exists z > x such that z < f(y−),
which implies y > f−1(z) (otherwise f(y − ǫ) < z ∀ǫ > 0, leading to z ≥ f(y−)). The monotonicity
of f−1 yields y > f−1(t) for any t ≤ z. Hence g(x, y) = ∫ f(y)x (y − f−1(t))dt ≥ ∫ zx (y − f−1(t))dt > 0.
Next consider the case when x ∈ [f(y−), f(y)]. Since f−1(t) ≤ y ∀t < f(y), and f−1(t) ≥ y
∀t > x ≥ f(y−), we have g(x, y) = ∫ f(y)x (y − f−1(t))dt = 0.
Symmetrically, we can prove that g(x, y) = 0 when x ∈ [f(y), f(y+)], and g(x, y) > 0 when
x > f(y+). The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
B Two Auxiliary Optimization Problems
In this subsection we solve two auxiliary optimization problems, which play a key role in simplifying
the behavioral portfolio selection model.
Let Y be a given strictly positive random variable on (Ω,F , P ) with the probability distribution
function F (·). Let G(·) be another given distribution function with G(0) = 0. Consider the following
two optimization problems:
Maximize E[XY ]
subject to P (X ≤ x) = G(x) ∀x ∈ IR,
(44)
and
Minimize E[XY ]
subject to P (X ≤ x) = G(x) ∀x ∈ IR.
(45)
These are two highly non-convex optimization problems.
Lemma B.1 (i) Let h(·) be a non-decreasing function. If X and h(Y ) share the same distribution,
then E[XY ] ≤ E[h(Y )Y ] while the equality holds if and only if X ∈ [h(Y−), h(Y+)] a.s..
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(ii) Let h(·) be a non-increasing function. If X and h(Y ) share the same distribution, then
E[XY ] ≥ E[h(Y )Y ] while the equality holds if and only if X ∈ [h(Y−), h(Y+)] a.s.
Proof: (i) First assume h(0) = 0. Employing Lemma A.1, together with the assumption that X and
h(Y ) have the same distribution, we have
E[XY ] ≤ E[
∫ X
0
h−1(u)du] +E[
∫ Y
0
h(u)du]
= E[
∫ h(Y )
0
h−1(u)du] + E[
∫ Y
0
h(u)du] = E[h(Y )Y ],
and the equality holds if and only if X ∈ [h(Y−), h(Y+)] a.s..
For the general case when h(0) 6= 0, define h¯(x) := h(x)− h(0). Then
E[XY ] = E[(X − h(0))Y ] + h(0)EY ≤ E[h¯(Y )Y ] + h(0)EY = E[h(Y )Y ].
(ii) It is straightforward by applying the result in (i) to −X and −h(Y ). Q.E.D.
Theorem B.1 Assume that Y admits no atom.
(i) Define X∗1 := G
−1(F (Y )). Then E[X∗1Y ] ≥ E[XY ] for any feasible solution X of Problem
(44). If in addition E[X∗1Y ] < +∞, then X∗1 is the unique (in the sense of almost surely)
optimal solution for (44).
(ii) Define X∗2 := G
−1(1−F (Y )). Then E[X∗2Y ] ≤ E[XY ] for any feasible solution X of Problem
(45). If in addition E[X∗2Y ] < +∞, then X∗2 is the unique optimal solution for (45).
Proof: First of all note that Z := F (Y ) follows uniform distribution on the (open or closed) unit
interval.
(i) Define h1(x) := G
−1(F (x)). Then P{h1(Y ) ≤ x} = P{Z ≤ G(x)} = G(x), and h1(·) is
non-decreasing. By Lemma B.1, E[X∗1Y ] ≥ E[XY ] for any feasible solution X of Problem (44),
where X∗1 := h1(Y ). Furthermore, if E[X
∗
1Y ] < +∞, and there is X which is optimal for (44), then
E[XY ] = E[X∗1Y ]. By Lemma B.1, X ∈ [h1(Y−), h1(Y+)] a.s.. Since h1(·) is non-decreasing, its
set of discontinuous points is at most countable. However, Y admits no atom; hence h1(Y−) =
h1(Y+) = h1(Y ), a.s., which implies that X = h1(Y ) = X
∗
1 , a.s.. Therefore we have proved that X
∗
1
is the unique optimal solution for (44).
(ii) Define h2(x) := G
−1(1 − F (x)). It is immediate that P{h2(Y ) ≤ x} = G(x), and h2(·) is
non-increasing. Applying Lemma B.1 and a similar argument as in (i) we obtain the desired result.
Q.E.D.
The preceding theorem shows that the optimal solution to (44) is comonotonic with Y , and that
to (44) is anti-comonotonic with Y .
C A Choquet Maximization Problem
Consider a general utility maximization problem involving the Choquet integral:
Maximize V1(X) =
∫ +∞
0 T (P{u(X) > y})dy
subject to E[ξX] = a, X ≥ 0,
(46)
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where ξ is a given strictly positive random variable, with no atom and whose distribution function is
Fξ(·), a ≥ 0, T : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing, differentiable function with T (0) = 0, T (1) =
1, and u(·) is a strictly concave, strictly increasing, twice differentiable function with u(0) = 0,
u′(0) = +∞, u′(+∞) = 0.
The case a = 0 is trivial, where X∗ = 0 is the only feasible, and hence optimal, solution. So we
assume a > 0 in what follows. The difficulty with (46) is that it is a non-convex optimization problem
with a constraint; thus the normal technique like Lagrange multiplier does not apply directly. The
approach we develop here is to change the decision variable and turn the problem into a convex
problem through a series of transformations. To start with, we have the following lemma.
Lemma C.1 If Problem (46) admits an optimal solution X∗ whose distribution function is G(·),
then X∗ = G−1(1− Fξ(ξ)), a.s..
Proof: Since a > 0, G(t) 6≡ 1. Denote X¯ := G−1(1− Fξ(ξ)). Notice that 1− Fξ(ξ) ∼ U(0, 1); thus
X¯ has the same distribution as X∗ and E[ξX¯ ] > 0.
If X∗ = X¯ a.s. is not true, then it follows from the uniqueness result in Theorem B.1 that
E[ξX¯ ] < E[ξX∗] = a. Define X1 := kX¯ , where k := a/E[ξX¯ ] > 1. Then X1 is feasible for (46), and
V1(X1) > V1(X¯) = V1(X
∗), which contradicts the optimality of X∗. Q.E.D.
Lemma C.1 implies that an optimal solution to (46), if it exists, must be anti-comonotonic with
ξ.
Denote Z := 1 − Fξ(ξ). Then Z follows U(0, 1), and ξ = F−1ξ (1 − Z), a.s., thanks to ξ being
atomless. Lemma C.1 suggests that in order to solve (46) one needs only to seek among random
variables in the form G−1(Z), where G is the distribution function of a nonnegative random variable
[i.e., G is non-decreasing, ca`dla`g, with G(0−) = 0, G(+∞) = 1]. Motivated by this observation, we
introduce the following problem
Maximize v1(G) :=
∫ +∞
0 T (P{u(G−1(Z)) > t})dt
subject to
{
E[G−1(Z)F−1ξ (1 − Z)] = a,
G is the distribution function of a nonnegative random variable.
(47)
The following result, which is straightforward in view of Lemma C.1, stipulates that Problem
(47) is equivalent to Problem (46).
Proposition C.1 If G∗ is optimal for (47), then X∗ := (G∗)−1(Z) is optimal for (46). Con-
versely, if X∗ is optimal for (46), then its distribution function G∗ is optimal for (47) and X∗ =
(G∗)−1(Z), a.s..
Now we turn to Problem (47). Denoting T¯ (x) := T (1− x), x ∈ [0, 1], and u¯ := supx∈IR+ u(x), we
have
v1(G) =
∫ u¯
0
T¯
(
P{u(G−1(Z)) ≤ y}) dy = ∫ u¯
0
T¯
(
P{Z ≤ G(u−1(y))}) dy
=
∫ u¯
0
T¯ (G(u−1(y)))dy =
∫ 1
0
u(G−1(T¯−1(t)))dt
= −
∫ 1
0
u(G−1(s))T¯ ′(s)ds =
∫ 1
0
u(G−1(s))T ′(1− s)ds
= E
[
u(G−1(Z))T ′(1− Z)] .
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Denoting
Γ := {g : [0, 1) 7→ IR+ is non-decreasing, left continuous, with g(0) = 0},
and considering g = G−1, we can rewrite Problem (47) into
Maximize v¯1(g) := E[u(g(Z))T
′(1− Z)]
subject to E[g(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ.
(48)
Some remarks on the set Γ are in order. Since any given g ∈ Γ is left continuous, we can always
extend it to a map from [0, 1] to IR+ ∪ {+∞} by setting g(1) := g(1−). It is easy to see that
g(1) < +∞ if and only if the corresponding random variable η (i.e., η is such a random variable
whose distribution function has an inverse identical to g) is almost surely bounded from above.
Since T ′(·) > 0 and u(·) is concave, the objective functional of (48) is now concave in g. On
the other hand, the constraint functional E[g(Z)F−1ξ (1 − Z)] is linear in g. Hence we can use the
Lagrange method to remove this linear constraint as follows. For a given λ ∈ IR,
Maximize v˜λ1 (g) := E
[
u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)− λg(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)
]
subject to g ∈ Γ,
(49)
and then determine λ via the original linear constraint.
Although Problem (49) is a convex optimization problem in g, it has an implicit constraint that
g be non-decreasing; hence is very complex. Let us ignore this constraint for the moment. For each
fixed z ∈ (0, 1) we maximize u(g(z))T ′(1−z)−λg(z)F−1ξ (1−z) over g(z) ∈ IR+. The zero-derivative
condition gives g(z) = (u′)−1(λF−1ξ (1 − z)/T ′(1 − z)). Now, if F−1ξ (z)/T ′(z) happens to be non-
decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1], then g(z) is non-decreasing in z ∈ [0, 1) and, hence, it solves (49). On
the other hand, if F−1ξ (z)/T
′(z) is not non-decreasing, then it remains an open problem to express
explicitly the optimal solution to (49).
Denote Ru(x) := −xu
′′(x)
u′(x) , x > 0, which is the Arrow–Pratt index of relative risk aversion of the
utility function u(·).
Proposition C.2 Assume that F−1ξ (z)/T
′(z) is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1] and
lim infx→+∞Ru(x) > 0. Then the following claims are equivalent:
(i) Problem (48) is well-posed for any a > 0.
(ii) Problem (48) admits a unique optimal solution for any a > 0.
(iii) E
[
u
(
(u′)−1( ξT ′(Fξ(ξ)))
)
T ′(Fξ(ξ))
]
< +∞.
(iv) E
[
u
(
(u′)−1( λξT ′(Fξ(ξ)))
)
T ′(Fξ(ξ))
]
< +∞ ∀λ > 0.
Furthermore, when one of the above (i)–(iv) holds, the optimal solution to (48) is
g∗(x) ≡ (G∗)−1(x) = (u′)−1
(
λF−1ξ (1− x)
T ′(1− x)
)
, x ∈ [0, 1),
where λ > 0 is the one satisfying E[(G∗)−1(1− Fξ(ξ))ξ] = a.
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Proof: Since T ′(1−Z) > 0 and E[T ′(1−Z)] = ∫ 10 T ′(x)dx = T (1)− T (0) = 1, we can define a
new probability measure P˜ whose expectation E˜(X) := E[T ′(1− Z)X].
Denote ζ :=
F−1ξ (1−Z)
T ′(1−Z) ≡ ξT ′(Fξ(ξ)) . Then ζ > 0 a.s.. Rewrite Problem (48) in terms of the
probability measure P˜ as follows
Maximize v¯1(g) := E˜[u(g(Z))]
subject to E˜[ζg(Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ.
(50)
By Jin, Xu and Zhou (2007, Theorem 6) and the fact that g∗(x) = (u′)−1
(
λF−1ξ (1−x)
T ′(1−x)
)
is automat-
ically non-decreasing in x, we get the desired result. Q.E.D.
We now summarize all the results above in the following theorem.
Theorem C.1 Assume that F−1ξ (z)/T
′(z) is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1] and lim infx→+∞Ru(x) >
0. Define X(λ) := (u′)−1
(
λξ
T ′(Fξ(ξ))
)
for λ > 0. If V1(X(1)) < +∞, then X(λ) is an optimal solution
for Problem (46), where λ is the one satisfying E[ξX(λ)] = a. If V1(X(1)) = +∞, then Problem
(46) is ill-posed.
To conclude this subsection, we state a necessary condition of optimality for Problem (46), which
is useful in solving Problem (13) in Step 2.
Lemma C.2 If g is optimal for (49), then either g ≡ 0 or g(x) > 0 ∀x > 0.
Proof: Suppose g 6≡ 0. We now show that g(x) > 0 ∀x > 0. If not, define δ := inf{x > 0 :
g(x) > 0}. Then 0 < δ < 1, and g(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [0, δ].
For any y > 0, let ǫ(y) := inf{x > 0 : g(δ + x) > y} and
gy(x) :=


0, x ∈ [0, δ/2],
y, x ∈ (δ/2, δ + ǫ(y)],
g(x), x ∈ (δ + ǫ(y), 1).
Then
E[u(gy(Z))T
′(1− Z)− λgy(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)]−E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)− λg(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)]
=
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
[u(y)T ′(1− x)− λyF−1ξ (1− x)]dx−
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ
[u(g(x))T ′(1− x)− λg(x)F−1ξ (1− x)]dx
≥
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
[u(y)T ′(1− x)− λyF−1ξ (1− x)]dx−
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ
u(g(x))T ′(1− x)dx
≥ u(y)
∫ δ
δ/2
T ′(1− x)dx− λy
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
F−1ξ (1− x)dx
= y
[
u(y)
y
(T (1− δ/2) − T (1− δ)) − λ
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
F−1ξ (1− x)dx
]
.
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Since u(y)y → +∞ as y → 0 and T (1− δ/2) − T (1− δ) > 0, we have u(y)y (T (1 − δ/2) − T (1− δ))→
+∞ as y → 0. On the other hand, ǫ(y)→ 0 as y → 0; hence∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
F−1ξ (1− x)dx ≤ (ǫ(y) + δ/2)F−1ξ (1− δ/2)→ δ/2F−1ξ (1− δ/2) as y → 0.
Consequently,
u(y)
y
(T (1− δ/2) − T (1− δ)) − λ
∫ δ+ǫ(y)
δ/2
F−1ξ (1− x)dx→ +∞ as y → 0.
Fix y > 0 sufficiently small so that the left hand side of the above is no less than 1. Then
E[u(gy(Z))T
′(1− Z)− λgy(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)]− E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)− λg(Z)F−1ξ (1− Z)] ≥ y > 0,
which implies that gy is strictly better than g for (49). Q.E.D.
Theorem C.2 If X∗ is an optimal solution for (46) with some a > 0, then P (X∗ = 0) = 0.
Proof: Proposition C.1 implies that the distribution function G∗ of X∗ is optimal for (47). By
Lagrange method there exists λ ≥ 0 such that (G∗)−1 is optimal for (49). Since a > 0, (G∗)−1 6≡ 0.
It follows then from Lemma C.2 that (G∗)−1(x) > 0 ∀x > 0, or G∗(0) = 0. Q.E.D.
So an optimal solution to (46) with a positive initial budget is positive almost surely.
D A Choquet Minimization Problem
Consider a general utility minimization problem involving the Choquet integral:
Minimize V2(X) :=
∫ +∞
0 T (P{u(X) > y})dy
subject to E[ξX] = a, X ≥ 0,
(51)
where ξ, a, T (·) satisfy the same assumptions as those with Problem (46), and u(·) is strictly
increasing, concave with u(0) = 0.
It is easy to see that (51) always admits feasible solutions (e.g., X = x1ξ≤ξ0 is feasible with
appropriate x ∈ IR, ξ0 ∈ IR); hence the optimal value of (51) is a finite nonnegative number.
In view of Theorem B.1, a similar argument to that in Appendix C reveals that the optimal
solution X∗ to (51) must be in the form of G−1(Fξ(ξ)) for some distribution function G(·), which
can be determined by the following problem
Minimize v2(G) :=
∫ +∞
0 T (P{u(G−1(Z)) > y})dy
subject to
{
E[G−1(Z)F−1ξ (Z)] = a,
G is the distribution function of a nonnegative random variable,
(52)
where Z := Fξ(ξ).
Proposition D.1 If G∗ is optimal for (52), then X∗ := (G∗)−1(Z) is optimal for (51). Con-
versely, if X∗ is optimal for (51), then its distribution function G∗ is optimal for (52) and X∗ =
(G∗)−1(Z), a.s..
38
By the same calculation as in Appendix C, we have v2(G) = E[u(G
−1(Z))T ′(1− Z)]. Denoting
g = G−1, Problem (52) can be rewritten as
Minimize v¯2(g) := E[u(g(Z))T
′(1− Z)]
subject to E[g(Z)F−1ξ (Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ.
(53)
Since the objective of the above problem is to minimize a concave functional, its solution must
have a very different structure compared with Problem (46), which in turn requires a completely
different technique to obtain. Specifically, the solution should be a “corner point solution” (in the
terminology of linear program). The question is how to characterize such a corner point solution in
the present setting.
Proposition D.2 Assume that u(·) is strictly concave at 0. Then the optimal solution for Problem
(53), if it exists, must be in the form g(t) = q(b)1(b,1)(t), t ∈ [0, 1), with some b ∈ [0, 1) and
q(b) := a
E[F−1ξ (Z)1(b,1)(Z)]
.
Proof: Denote f(·) := F−1ξ (·) for notational convenience. We assume a > 0 (otherwise the result
holds trivially). If g is an optimal solution to (53), then g 6≡ 0. Fix t1 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(t1) > 0.
Define k :=
R 1
0
g(t)f(t)dt
R t1
0 g(t)f(t)dt+g(t1 )
R 1
t1
f(t)dt
, and
g¯(t) :=
{
kg(t), if t ∈ [0, t1]
kg(t1) if t ∈ (t1, 1).
Then g¯(·) ∈ Γ, and ∫ 10 g¯(t)f(t)dt = k ∫ t10 g(t)f(t)dt + kg(t1) ∫ 1t1 f(t)dt = ∫ 10 g(t)f(t)dt, implying that
g¯(·) is feasible for (53). We now claim that g(t) = g(t1), a.e.t ∈ (t1, 1). Indeed, if this is not true,
then k > 1. Define λ := 1− 1/k ∈ (0, 1) and g˜(t) := g(t)−g(t1)λ 1t>t1 , t ∈ [0, 1). Then
(1− λ)g¯(t) + λg˜(t) = g(t) ∀t ∈ [0, 1). (54)
It follows from the concavity of u(·) that v¯2(g) ≥ (1− λ)v¯2(g¯) + λv¯2(g˜), and the equality holds only
if
u(g(t)) = (1− λ)u(g¯(t)) + λu(g˜(t)), a.e.t ∈ (0, 1).
Owing to the optimality of g, the above equality does hold. However, the equality when t ≤ t1
implies that u(·) is not strictly concave at 0, which is a contradiction.
Denote b := inf{t ≥ 0 : g(t) > 0}. The preceding analysis shows that g(t) = k1t>b for some
k ∈ IR+. The feasibility of g(·) determines k ≡ q(b) = a
E[F−1ξ (Z)1(b,1)(Z)]
. Q.E.D.
By left-continuity one can extend the optimal g described in Proposition D.2 to [0, 1] by defining
g(1) := q(b). Moreover, since g(t) is uniformly bounded in t ∈ [0, 1], it follows from Proposition D.1
that any optimal solution X∗ to (51) can be represented as X∗ = g(Z), hence must be uniformly
bounded from above.
Proposition D.2 suggests that we only need to find an optimal number b ∈ [0, 1) so as to solve
Problem (53), which motivates the introduction of the following problem
Minimize v˜2(b) := E[u(g(Z))T
′(1− Z)]
subject to g(·) = a
E[F−1ξ (Z)1(b,1](Z)]
1(b,1](·), 0 ≤ b < 1.
(55)
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Proposition D.3 Problems (53) and (55) have the same infimum values.
Proof: Denote by α and β the infimum values of Problems (53) and (55) respectively. Clearly
α ≤ β. If the opposite inequality is false, then there is a feasible solution g for (53) such that
v¯2(g) < β.
For any s ∈ [0, 1), define k(s) =
R 1
0 g(t)f(t)dtR s
0
g(t)f(t)dt+g(s)
R 1
s
f(t)dt
≥ 1, where f(·) := F−1ξ (·). Then
lims→1 k(s) = 1. Define
Hs(t) :=
{
k(s)g(t), t ∈ [0, s]
k(s)g(s), t ∈ (s, 1).
As shown in the proof of Proposition D.2, Hs(·) is feasible for (53), and
v¯2(Hs) ≤
∫ 1
0
u(k(s)g(t))T ′(1− t)dt
≤
∫ 1
0
k(s)u(g(t))T ′(1− t)dt→ v¯2(g), as s→ 1.
Therefore there exists s ∈ [0, 1), which we now fix, such that v2(Hs) < β. For any nonnegative
integer n, define a(n, k) :=
R k/2n
(k−1)/2n
Hs(t)f(t)dt
R k/2n
(k−1)/2n
f(t)dt
, for any k = 1, · · · , 2n. It is clear that Hs((k−1)/2n) ≤
a(n, k) ≤ Hs(k/2n). Define
gn(t) :=
2n∑
k=1
a(n, k)1((k−1)/2n ,k/2n](t), t ∈ [0, 1).
Clearly gn ∈ Γ, and
∫ 1
0 gn(t)f(t)dt =
∫ 1
0 Hs(t)f(t)dt = a, implying that gn is feasible for (53) for each
n. Furthermore, gn(t) → Hs(t) ∀t and 0 ≤ gn(t) ≤ k(s)g(s) ∀t, which leads to v¯2(gn) → v¯2(Hs).
So there exists n such that v¯2(gn) < β.
Because gn(·) is a left continuous and non-decreasing step function, we can rewrite it as
gn(t) =
m∑
k=1
ak−11(tk−1,tk ](t)
with 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tm = 1, 0 = a0 < a1 < a2 < · · · < am < +∞. Denote λk := ak−ak−1q(tk) ,
k = 1, 2, · · · ,m, where q(·) is defined in Proposition D.2. Then for any t ∈ (0, 1),
gn(t) =
m∑
k=1
ak−11(tk−1,tk](t) =
m∑
k=1
(ak − ak−1)1(tk ,1] =
m∑
k=1
λkJtk(t),
where Jtk(t) := q(tk)1(tk ,1]. Since
a ≡
∫ 1
0
gn(t)f(t)dt =
m∑
k=1
λk
∫ 1
0
Jtk(t)f(t)dt =
m∑
k=1
λka,
we conclude that
∑m
k=1 λk = 1, which means that gn is a convex combination of Jtk . It follows from
the concavity of u(·) that there exists k such that v¯2(Jtk ) ≤ v¯2(gn), which contradicts the conclusion
that v¯2(gn) < β ≤ v¯2(Jtk). Q.E.D.
Summarizing, we have the following result.
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Theorem D.1 Problems (51) and (55) have the same infimum values. If, in addition, u(·) is strictly
concave at 0, then (51) admits an optimal solution if and only if the following problem
min
0≤c<esssup ξ
u
(
a
E[ξ1ξ>c]
)
T (P (ξ > c))
admits an optimal solution c∗, in which case the optimal solution to (51) is X∗ = aE[ξ1ξ>c∗ ]1ξ>c∗.
Proof: The first conclusion follows from Proposition D.3. For the second conclusion, we rewrite
the objective functional of (55) as
v˜2(b) = E
[
u
(
q(b)1(b,1](Z)
)
T ′(1− Z)] = ∫ 1
b
u(q(b))T ′(1− t)dt = u(q(b))T (1 − b),
where b ∈ [0, 1). Now let c := F−1ξ (b) ∈ [0, esssup ξ). Then
v˜2(b) = u(q(b))T (1 − b) = u
(
a
E[ξ1ξ>c]
)
T (P (ξ > c)),
and the desired results are straightforward in view of Theorem D.2. Q.E.D.
E Replicating a Binary Option
In this subsection, we want to find a portfolio replicating the contingent claim ρα1ρ∈(c1,c2), where
0 ≤ c1 < c2 ≤ +∞, α ∈ IR, and ρ = ρ(T ) with
ρ(t) := exp
{
−(r + 1
2
|θ|2)t− θ′W (t)
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The claim resembles the payoff of a binary (or digital) option, except that ρ does not correspond to
any underlying stock [although it is indeed the terminal wealth of a mutual fund; see Bielecki et al.
(2005, Remark 7.3), for details].
Let ψ(·) and N(·) be the density function and distribution function of the standard normal
distribution respectively. Recall that ρ(t, T ) := ρ(T )/ρ(t) conditional on Ft follows a lognormal
distribution with parameters (µt, σ
2
t ) given by (41).
Theorem E.1 If c2 < +∞, then the wealth-portfolio pair replicating ρα1ρ∈(c1,c2) is
x(t) = ρ(t)
α
σt
∫ c2/ρ(t)
c1/ρ(t)
yαψ
(
ln y−µt
σt
)
dy,
π(t) = −
[
αx(t)− 1σtρ(t)
(
cα+12 ψ
(
ln c2−µt−lnρ(t)
σt
)
− cα+11 ψ
(
ln c1−µt−lnρ(t)
σt
))]
(σσ′)−1B.
If c2 = +∞, then the corresponding replicating pair is
x(t) = ρ(t)
α
σt
∫ +∞
c1/ρ(t)
yαψ
(
ln y−µt
σt
)
dy,
π(t) = −
[
αx(t) + 1σtρ(t)c
α+1
1 ψ
(
ln c1−µt−lnρ(t)
σt
)]
(σσ′)−1B.
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Proof: When c2 < +∞, the replicating wealth process is
x(t) = E[ρ(t, T )ρ(T )α1ρ(T )∈(c1,c2)|Ft]
= ρ(t)αE[ρ(t, T )α+11ρ(t,T )∈(c1/ρ(t),c2/ρ(t))|Ft]
= ρ(t)α
∫ c2/ρ(t)
c1/ρ(t)
yα+1dN
(
ln y − µt
σt
)
=
ρ(t)α
σt
∫ c2/ρ(t)
c1/ρ(t)
yαψ
(
ln y − µt
σt
)
dy = f(t, ρ(t)),
where f(t, ρ) := ρ
α
σt
∫ c2/ρ
c1/ρ
yαψ
(
ln y−µt
σt
)
dy. It is well known that the replicating portfolio is
π(t) = −(σσ′)−1B∂f(t, ρ(t))
∂ρ
ρ(t); (56)
see, e.g., Bielecki et al. (2005, Eq. (7.6)). Now we calculate
∂f(t, ρ)
∂ρ
=
αρα−1
σt
∫ c2/ρ
c1/ρ
yαψ
(
ln y − µt
σt
)
dy
+
ρα
σt
[(
c2
ρ
)α
ψ
(
ln c2 − µt − ln ρ
σt
) −c2
ρ2
−
(
c1
ρ
)α
ψ
(
ln c1 − µt − ln ρ
σt
) −c1
ρ2
]
=
αx(t)
ρ
− 1
σtρ2
[
cα+12 ψ
(
ln c2 − µt − ln ρ
σt
)
− cα+11 ψ
(
ln c1 − µt − ln ρ
σt
)]
.
Plugging in (56) we get the desired result.
The case with c2 = +∞ can be dealt with similarly (in fact more easily). Q.E.D.
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